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The present highway funding system, especially fuel taxes, may become a less 
reliable revenue source in the future, while the transportation public agencies do not have 
sufficient financial resources needed to meet the increasing traffic demand. In the last two 
decades there has been increasing interest in utilizing private sector to develop, finance 
and operate new and existing roadways in the United States. While transportation 
privatization projects have shown signs of success, it is not always clear how to measure 
the true benefits associated with these projects for all stakeholders, including the public 
sector, the private sector and the public. “Win-win” privatization agreements are tricky to 
make due to conflicting nature of the various stakeholders involved. Therefore, there is a 
huge need to study the welfare impacts of various road privatization arrangements for the 
society as a whole, and the financial implications for private investors and public road 
authorities.  
  
In order to address these needs, first, an empirical analysis is performed to study 
the investment decision processes of public transportation agencies. Second, the agent-
based decision-making model is developed to consider transportation investment 
processes at different levels of government which forecasts future transportation 
networks and their performance under both existing and alternative transportation 
planning processes. Third, various highway privatization schemes currently practiced in 
the U.S. are identified and an agent-based model for analyzing regulatory policies on 
private-sector transportation investments is developed. Fourth, the above mentioned 
models are demonstrated on the networks with grid and beltway topologies to study the 
impacts of topology configuration on the privatization arrangements. Based on the 
simulation results of developed models, a number of insights are provided about impacts 
of ownership structures on the socio-economic performance in transportation systems and 
transportation network changes over time. The proposed models and the approach can be 
used in long-run prediction of economic performance intended for describing a general 
methodology for transportation planning on large networks. Therefore, this research is 
expected to contribute significantly to the understanding and selecting proper road 
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Traditionally, in the United States it has been assumed that roads should be 
constructed and maintained by the public sector and be free of charge. However, the 
present highway funding system, especially fuel taxes, may become less reliable 
revenue sources in the future, while the public transportation agencies do not have 
financial resources to meet the needs of maturing infrastructure and increasing traffic 
demand. Facing budgetary constraints and recognizing their inability to provide 
infrastructure services timely and efficiently, state and local governments are now 
willing to cooperate with private sector agencies in order to bring additional 
investments into transportation infrastructure. As a result, a growing number of roads 
in the United States are being operated privately or by various forms of public–
private partnerships (PPPs) (Roth 1996). 
Although private investment in infrastructure is not quite new for this country, 
conversion of government owned infrastructure into privately owned or operated is a 
fairly new movement. A wide range of approaches and models have been proposed to 
study socio-economic effects of private ownership, but just few studies have been 
devoted to the detailed analysis of the ownership structure and its resulting socio-
economic outcome. This research is focused on toll road financing and optimal 




achieving welfare maximizing goals at the federal and state levels and profit 
maximizing interests of private entities. It is believed that a better understanding of 
various private financing options can assist transportation policy makers with the 
selection of investment policies that achieve a greater balance between revenue and 
equity objectives. Therefore, the goal of this research is to provide an insight about 
institutional strategies that may best align the private sector’s profit-maximizing and 
resource efficiency objectives with the government’s social welfare maximizing 
objectives.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
As the traffic demand increases at a faster rate than the upgrade and 
maintenance of transportation facilities funded by the traditional public financing 
methods, there is currently significant deficiency in transportation infrastructure.  At 
present 33 percent of America’s major roads are in poor condition and 36 percent of 
America’s major urban highways are congested. Each year Americans lose 4.2 billion 
hours and 2.9 billion gallons of fuel stuck in traffic, creating a 78.2-billion-dollar 
annual drain on the U.S. economy (TTI 2007). The nation’s population grew by 20 
percent from 1990 to 2006 and vehicle travel on highways increased by 41 percent 
during the same time period, while new road mileage increased by only 4 percent 
(TRIP 2010). Moreover, much of the existing roadway system is beyond its designed 
service life and needs major improvements or replacements (Samuel 2000). 




main revenue source, can no longer meet the required transportation system 
maintenance and expansion needs. Over the last two decades, the buying power of 
motor fuel taxes has been significantly weakened by the combined effects of 
inflation, improved vehicle fuel efficiency, increased construction costs and diversion 
of road funding to other transportation programs. In contrast, there is a lack of 
political will at both the federal and state levels to increase fuel tax rates. The federal 
fuel tax has remained at 19.3 cents per gallon since 1993. All these factors have 
jointly led to an unprecedented challenge and funding gap for public-sector roadway 
transportation financing in the U.S. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that 
private investment resources have already found several ways to enter the U.S. 
roadway systems. Although most roads in the U.S. are still owned and operated by 
government agencies, an emerging trend is characterized by the development of new 
private toll roads (e.g. Denver E-470, Texas State Highway 130, The Dulles 
Greenway, San Diego SR125) and the private takeover/leasing of existing state-
owned roads (e.g. Chicago Skyway, Indiana Turnpike). U.S. Department of 
Transportation 2006 statistics show that more than 50% of the current highway mega-
projects (> $500 million investment) involve some form of public-private 
partnerships (PPP). Various PPP schemes have been adopted for these projects in 
their finance, leasing, design, build, operate, maintenance, and ownership transfer 
stages. The most popular regulatory tools include concession period agreement, price 
ceiling (i.e. maximum toll rates), revenue sharing and shadow tolling.  
Private financing is believed to be a suitable approach to provide financing for 




maintenance costs from government to private companies. Private toll roads can 
provide a new revenue stream for highway systems, provide extra road capacity, 
better quality road services and be effective tool for congestion management. 
However, various considerations need to be addressed regarding the proper scope of 
private sector involvement in roadway financing. Roads have monopoly power 
because they uniquely occupy space. There also exist barriers to market entry 
including the significant sunk cost of building new roads and the uncertain return on 
road investment especially when competitors already exists. Also, equity and safety 
concerns are not necessarily consistent with the profit-maximizing objective of 
private investors.  
To reliably estimate the impacts of the privatization of roadways, this 
dissertation addresses these problems in the following steps. First, the literature 
review is provided to study the history of transportation financing in the United 
States. Here it is described in detail how the US highway system was financed, 
constructed and operated; how traditionally FHWA, State DOTs, small and big 
MPOs, as well as state counties were generating revenues for highway and transit 
systems in their jurisdictions and how that money was allocated to different activities. 
In addition it is discussed how private investment resources have found ways to enter 
the U.S. roadway systems, how private toll roads are regulated and what are the 
benefits and drawbacks of private-sector roadway ownership. Also, the previous 
research on roadway privatization and methods of studying network changes is 
presented. Second, a qualitative analysis of the multimodal transportation investment 




Baltimore area is provided. Interviews have been conducted for this research with 
staff members at the county-, metropolitan-, state- and regional-level agencies. 
Findings from these interviews reveal the details of the investment process in the DC 
region, and the advantages and disadvantages of the existing processes and 
procedures.  Third, a quantitative model with agent-based techniques is developed 
that forecasts future networks and their performance under existing and alternative 
transportation planning processes based on information obtained from qualitative 
analysis of the multimodal transportation investment decision processes in the 
Washington DC region. This model predicts the long-term impacts of transportation 
planning and policy decisions on the network evolution and configuration. In the 
fourth step such a quantitative agent-based model is developed that simulates the 
evolutionary process of roadway privatization and captures its impacts on roadway 
users, private investors, and the society at large. Privatization of roadways is 
considered in this research with a primarily U.S. focus. However, the methodology 
developed herein for analyzing the impact of private roads on users, private investors, 
and social welfare is general, and can be applied for roadway privatization studies 
elsewhere. In the final step, the developed models of future networks under existing 
and alternative transportation planning processes and of roadway privatization are 
demonstrated on the networks with grid and beltway topologies to demonstrate the 
effects of topology configuration on the privatization arrangements.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The 




section summarizes expected research contributions. The organization of this 
dissertation is then discussed in some depth to offer an overview of the research plan. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Methodology 
 
A practical motivation of this research arises from a growing interest of 
deploying private sector investments into transportation infrastructure. As a result, an 
increasing number of private toll road projects are constructed or proposed in the U.S. 
through various forms of privatization agreements, and more states are removing 
legal constraints on the entry of private roads into the existing public road system. 
Therefore, it is very important to analyze the welfare and financial implications of 
utilizing private sector capitals in road financing for both public policy decisions and 
private investment decisions for improving forecasting, planning, policy-making, and 
evaluation, as well as to understand how public and private transportation investment 
decisions and policies translate into transportation facilities on the ground in the long-
run. Therefore the objective of this dissertation is twofold: (1) to understand how 
jurisdictional planning and investment decision-making processes translate into 
transportation facilities on the ground, and develop the quantitative model with agent-
based techniques, which can forecast future transportation networks and their 
performance under both existing and alternative transportation planning processes; 
and (2) to identify the various highway privatization schemes currently practiced in 




private-sector transportation investments, as well as to demonstrate its applicability 
on real-world Maryland statewide network.   
In order to achieve the specified objectives, the following methodology is 
developed to achieve the desired research outcomes:  
1. Interview the key agencies responsible for transportation planning and funding 
allocation in the Washington DC region. In particular, learn what are: 
• Agencies’ main priorities and criteria that guide investment processes;  
• Procedures for identifying needs and generating candidate projects; 
• Procedure for selecting/prioritizing candidate projects;  
• Methods for quantitative technical project evaluation, and the role of  non-
technical  political influences; 
• Procedures for agency interactions concerning needs identification and 
funding allocation; 
• Summarize the data collected from interviews and draw conclusions. 
2. Develop a quantitative model with agent-based techniques that forecasts future 
networks and their performance under existing and alternative multi-modal and multi-
jurisdictional transportation investment decision-making processes based on 
information obtained from interview qualitative analysis;  
3. Develop a quantitative agent-based model that simulates the evolutionary process 
of roadway privatization under public and private ownership regimes and captures its 
impacts on roadway users, private investors, and the society at large, and test the 




4. Study the impact of regulation and network topology on the effectiveness of 
roadway privatization.  
The described objectives and methodology of this research lead to the 
research contributions specified below.  
 
1.4 Research Overview 
 
The remaining chapters of this dissertation are arranged in the following way. 
Chapter 2 presents literature review on transportation financing in the United States, 
on how private sector made its way into the transportation investment system, what 
types of roadway privatization there exist nowadays and what theoretical studies have 
been done with regard to toll road projects and network growth.  
Chapter 3 describes and analyzes the decision rules and processes currently 
adopted by various agencies in the Washington DC and Baltimore region. Interviews 
have been conducted with staff members at the county, metropolitan, state and 
regional transportation and planning agencies. The key research questions to address 
were how multimodal highway and transit investment decisions are made in this 
region, how transportation funds are allocated to different modes, different 
jurisdictions, and different projects, and how agencies at different levels of 
government interact with each other. Findings suggest that agencies have developed 
qualitative and quantitative methods to handle competing objectives and various 
considerations. This section also discusses how decision powers can be potentially 




Chapter 4 provides a background on how the agent-based models are 
developed in this research, and describes the major components of those models, such 
as demand and supply modules, cost and performance measures necessary for 
modeling investment prioritization processes of public and private sectors.   
Chapter 5 develops a quantitative model of public investment processes with 
agent-based techniques, and forecasts future transportation networks and their 
performance under both existing and alternative transportation planning processes. 
The existing planning process is modeled based on in-depth interviews with state, 
metropolitan, and local transportation agencies in the Washington DC-Baltimore 
Region that have influence on transportation investment decisions (these is described 
in detail in Chapter 3). 
Chapter 6 develops an agent-based model of mixed ownership structures, and 
forecasts future transportation networks and their performance under alternative 
transportation planning processes and ownership regimes, as well as regulation 
scenarios. This chapter details four policy scenarios for the analysis, including the 
two roadway privatization scenarios and two benchmark scenarios: status quo and 
social optimum. 
Chapter 7 presents, interprets, and compares model results under each of the 
four policy scenarios, and discusses the findings and their policy implications. 
Conclusions are offered at the end of the chapter.      
Chapter 8 applies the proposed modeling framework to the networks with grid 
and beltway topologies to study the influence of topology configuration on the 




Chapter 9 concludes the research. It provides a summary of research efforts 
and findings, followed by an outlook on the advance of agent-based privatization 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
In this Chapter the literature review is provided on the history of 
transportation financing in the United States. It discusses how private investment 
resources have found ways to enter the U.S. roadway systems, how private toll roads 
are regulated and what are the benefits and drawbacks of private-sector roadway 
ownership, what private road categories there exist nowadays. Also, previous 
research on roadway privatization is reviewed and summarized on how the 
researchers have been modeling network growth patterns, since part of my research is 
focused on understanding how investment decisions and privatization arrangements 
affect network changes and their evolution in the long-run. 
 
2.1 Introduction to Transportation Financing Mechanism in the U.S 
 
The National Highway System of the U.S. is the longest highway system in 
the world, comprising approximately 162,000 miles of roadway, 97 percent of which 
is free to public traffic since government provided most of the funding through the 
years. The system is a product of a delicately balanced partnership of federal, state, 
regional and local governments, consisting of several subsystems of roadways 
(FHWA 2006 I). The majority of the Interstate System was built between the 1950s 
and 1980s. Since then small construction and improvements continue through the 




possible. The first is the creation of the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) and the 
dedication of federal fuel taxes to the fund. Without the HTF funding mechanism the 
Interstate Highway System would probably never have been possible. A financial 
report issued in 1991 estimated that the construction of the Interstate Highway 
System cost approximately $128.9 billion (in 1991 dollars); the federal government 
paid about 90 percent of the total costs from the HTF and state governments provided 
the remaining 10 percent with state matching funds (FHWA 2006 II).  
Motor fuel taxes, the major revenue source of transportation finance, were 
first set up as user fees under the rationale that people should pay in proportion to 
their use of the roadway system. Since first introduced, fuel taxes have played a 
crucial role in funding American highways. Besides motor fuel taxes, different levels 
of governments have a variety of additional sources for highway funding. State 
governments receive a significant portion of their highway funding from public 
bonds, tolls and other taxes and fees. Local governments’ main highway funding 
sources consist of general fund appropriation, property taxes and assessments and 
public bonds.  
However, during the past twenty years, investment in highway capacity has 
not been matched by capacity expansion needs in the highway infrastructure. Also, by 
1980, the nation’s highway facilities have shown signs of aging due to heavy use. 
Currently the government does not have sufficient resources needed to meet 
increasing demand due to decreasing revenues from fuel taxes. On the contrary, 
private financing is believed to be a suitable approach to provide financing for 




maintenance costs from government to private companies. Private toll roads can 
provide a new revenue stream for highway system, provide extra road capacity, better 
quality road services and be effective tool for congestion management.  
Private roads are not a new concept to the United States. Between the 1920s 
and 1960s many states issued tax-exempt public bonds to fund turnpikes to provide 
fast and convenient transportation. Around the mid 1980s, the U.S. interstate system 
has been completed, which was build with support of federal grants and gas tax 
revenues. In the late 1980s the nation’s highway system started to deteriorate. Since 
then the U.S. government has endeavored to once again utilize toll financing as a 
supplementary source for transportation finance.  
 
2.2 Reasons for Private Financing 
 
Attracting private capital to transportation infrastructure provision offers 
efficiency gains and shifts project risks from government. When investing in a toll 
road project, a private entity often becomes the project’s sponsor and is responsible 
for all the phases of the project’s development, such as design, construction, 
operation, and maintenance. In addition to responsibilities, private agency is also 
interested in cutting costs of construction and operation by being more efficient, 
resulting from superior private sector’s economy of scale and technical efficiency 
(Frantz 1992). 
To summarize, the following reasons have attracted attention to private sector: 




for raising taxes at all levels; (2) Increasing roadway construction and maintenance 
costs resulting from material, equipment, and labor price inflation; (3) Underpriced 
roadway travel and the willingness to charge higher user fees by the private sector; 
(4) Travel demand increase and worsening congestion; and (5) Immediate payments 
to the public sector based on concession agreement that can bring much-needed 
revenue to state and local governments. Consequently, a growing number of 
roadways in the U.S. are constructed and/or operated by the private sector through 
various forms of public-private partnerships (PPP).  
Under these conditions, it is not surprising that private investment resources 
have already found several ways to enter the U.S. roadway systems. The idea of 
private roadway financing is not a new concept in the U.S. and dates back to the 
beginning of roadway construction. In general, privatization arises from the beliefs of 
private sector being fundamentally more efficient than the public sector; the 
possibility of new sources of funding to supplement the constrained resources of the 
public sector and the potential for financing without increasing taxes. Roadway 
privatization can take many different forms, but four are the most common: the sale 
of existing state-owned highways, use of private financing and management instead 
of public for new infrastructure, contracting to private companies the facilities 
previously provided by government for a limited period of time, i.e. concession, and 
simply contracting to the private sector roadway maintenance and operations tasks.  
In the U.S., more and more states have enacted or revised legislation allowing 
public-private partnerships in transportation facility projects and removing 




(Nossaman 2006), there were already 18 states that had relevant laws, which allowed 
proposals for PPP projects. Opening in 1995, the SR91 Express Lanes was the first 
privately funded toll road built in the United States since the 1940s. Since 2001, 
private leasing projects have been implemented in at least seven states: Alabama, 
California, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Texas, and Virginia. New privatization 
initiatives have been officially proposed or are moving forward in the following 
states: Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, New Jersey, 
Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Virginia.  
In the last few years, two multi-billion-dollar PPP toll road projects have 
attracted many interests and led to heated policy debates: the Chicago Skyway and 
the Indiana Toll Roads. In 2005, the Chicago government signed a 99-year 
concession to lease its 7.8 mile-Skyway toll road to a private sector for $1.8 billion. 
The Chicago Skyway is a landmark in the PPP toll road field, because it is the first 
long-term leasing toll road in the U.S. Indiana soon followed by leasing its 157-mile 
Indiana Toll Road out to the private sector for 75 years for $3.8 billion. Additional 
examples of the contracting out of existing public roads to the private sector include 
the Virginia Route 895 (Pocahontas Parkway), Dulles Greenway, South Bay 
Expressway (SR 125), Foley Beach Express, and the E-470 Toll way.  
New privately-owned toll roads represent another popular roadway 
privatization scheme in the U.S. In this case, a private investor builds toll roads on 
owned or leased land and assumes full ownership-like responsibilities including 
design, finance, construction, operation and maintenance, while the public sector 




including four small toll roads in Alabama (Emerald Mountain Parkway, Alabama 
River Parkway, Black Warrior Parkway Bridge and Foley Beach Express) and 
Poinciana Parkway in Florida. Recent High Occupancy Toll lane projects in several 
states can also be categorized as new private toll roads.  
A list of the major private toll roads projects in the U.S. is provided in Table 
2-1. It can be observed that various PPP schemes have been adopted for these projects 
in their finance, leasing, design, build, operate, maintenance, and ownership transfer 
stages. The most popular regulatory tools include concession period agreement, price 
ceiling (i.e. maximum toll rates), and revenue sharing.  
 
2.3 Benefits of Private Financing 
 
Private financing is believed to be a promising approach to mitigating the 
current transportation financial shortfall by providing a new revenue stream for 
highway system.  
After a private toll road is built, drivers pay for their direct use of the road and 
toll revenue go to retire the debt used to finance the construction and set aside funds 
for operation and maintenance of the road, to subsidize other relevant transport 
programs, or to be collected as project’s investment return. Hence private financing 
can support road maintenance and provide extra road capacity without further 






Project Name State Type of PPP Arrangement Regulation 
Chicago Skyway IL Lease - Operate 99-year concession, 
maximum toll rate 
setting 
Indiana Toll Road IN Lease - Operate 75-year concession, 
maximum toll rate 
setting 
Pokahontas Parkway VA Lease – Develop - Operate 99-year concession, 
revenue sharing 
agreement 
183A - Turnpike TX Design – Build   
I-15 Corridor 
Reconstruction 
UT Design – Build   
SH 130 (Segments 5 – 
6) 
TX Design – Build – Finance 




Route 3 North MA Design – Build - Maintain 30-year lease 
Dulles Greenway VA Design – Build – Finance 
- Operate  
Maximum toll setting 
Foley Beach Express AL Design – Build – Finance 
- Operate  
 




I – 595  FL Design – Build – Finance 
– Operate – Maintain  
35-year concession 
IH 635 Managed lanes TX Design – Build – Finance 
– Operate – Maintain  
52-year concession 
North Tarrant Express TX Design – Build – Finance 
– Operate – Maintain 
52-year concession 
South Bay Expressway CA Build-Transfer-Operate  35-year concession, 
market tolls 
DC Streets DC Operate and Maintain 5-year concession 
King Coal Highway WV Design - Build  
Palmetto Expressway  FL Design – Build - Finance  
I-635 Managed Lanes TX Design – Build – Finance 








Northwest Parkway CO Lease – Operate  99-year lease, revenue 
sharing agreement 
Source: FHWA http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ipd/p3/ 
 




Besides providing extra road funding, private financing has been proved to be 
an effective tool for congestion management (Samuel 2000; Nash 2007). Also, 
private roads are expected to provide better quality road services because of the self-
financing nature of the roads. Unlike general transportation agencies that rely on 
legislators for funding and tend to be responsive to key politicians, private agencies 
are inclined to be more customer oriented because they live on toll revenues from 
hundreds of thousands of motorists and hence are under more pressure to provide 
good value for money. Last but not least, fairness is another strong argument in 
support of private finance. The sense of fairness lies in the fact that private roads 
usually charge variable tolls based on the number of vehicle axles, meaning heavier 
vehicles like trucks pay higher tolls than regular passenger automobiles. The rationale 
behind the policy is that heavy vehicles tend to impose more costs on roads than 
lighter vehicles and that it is fair for those impose more road costs to pay 
proportionately (Samuel 2000). In fact, the current highway charge system centering 
on motor fuel taxes is doing a poor job of reflecting road costs imposed by heavy 
vehicles. Most toll roads generally charge variable tolls based on the number of 
vehicle axles, a way corresponding more closely than motor fuel taxes with the 
degree of pavement wear imposed by vehicles. Hence private roads have greater 





2.4 Concerns Regarding Private Financing 
 
Double taxation is the greatest concern many people have about private roads. 
Motorists argue they already pay for roads through user fees, mostly in the form of 
motor fuel taxes, and charging tolls on facilities, especially the ones built and 
operated with taxes, constitutes double taxation (Samuel 2000). This is hardly a valid 
argument which can be rebutted from two perspectives. The buying power of motor 
fuel taxes has been significantly weakened, user fees paid in this manner are simply 
not enough to pay for current road services and hence charging extra fees is 
necessary. Also heavy vehicles are paying much less than the costs they impose on 
roads in the current user charge system and tolling is an effective way to correct the 
unfairness by charging user fees in proportion to the costs vehicles impose on roads. 
Another way to explain why tolling does not constitute double taxation is to 
define transportation costs as consisting of direct costs of building and maintaining a 
roadway and indirect costs of traffic emission, noise and delays imposed by users on 
the road system. Motor fuel taxes only pay for direct costs of roadway system and 
don’t cover the indirect costs. However, when drivers squeeze their vehicles onto 
already crowded freeways, they impose surprisingly large levels of additional delay 
on the vehicles already on the network. Therefore, the indirect costs associated with 
traffic delays, noise and emissions are in fact very significant and should not be 
ignored (Wachs et al. 2003). By imposing tolls on private roadway, drivers are 





2.5 Private Road Categories 
 
There are several most common private road arrangements in the U.S: 
• Design-Bid-Build (DBB): Design-Bid-Build is a traditional contracting 
method for a construction project. Under this mode, the design and 
construction phases are bid and performed by separate independent 
contractors. 
• Shadow Toll and Private Contract Fee Services: Shadow tolls are payments 
made by government to the private sector operator of a road based, at least in 
part, on the number of vehicles using the road. First proposed in the UK by 
the Conservative government in 1993, they are currently in operation on some 
roads in the UK, and then have also been adopted in other countries. Private 
contract fee service is a kind of shadow toll. Public operating agencies utilize 
fee service contracts to transfer responsibility for asset operation and 
management to the private sector. These comprehensive agreements involve 
both service and management aspects and are often useful in encouraging 
enhanced efficiencies and technological sophistication. Contractors can be 
paid either on a fixed fee basis or on an incentive basis, where they receive 
premiums for meeting specified service levels or performance targets. 
• Design-Build (DB): Design-Build is an innovative contracting method for a 
construction project, comparing to the Design-Bid-Build method. Under this 
mode, the agency or owner holds a single contract with a single private entity 




will transfer the road to the government and state when construction is 
completed. 
• Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT)/Design-Build-Operate-Maintain (DBOM): 
Under this mode, private firms will receive a franchise from the public sector 
to build a road and operate it, get the investment back through the revenue of 
the toll road. The government and state generally sets out regulatory 
provisions in the franchise agreement to regulate the toll of the road. After a 
specify period, which was negotiated before, the toll road will be taken over 
by the state usually without charge and debt.  
• Lease-Develop-Operate (LDO)/ Lease Agreements: Under this mode, the 
private firms and government will negotiate a lease that the government holds 
the ownership of the road and the private firms will lease the toll road for a 
period of time to get the investment back from the revenue. The government 
and state generally sets out regulatory provisions in the franchise agreement to 
regulate the toll of the road. After a specified period, which is previously 
negotiated, the toll road will be transferred back to the public sector.  
• Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO): Under this mode, the private sector 
may agree to provide some or all of the financing for the toll road project by 
raising independent capital. Then the private sector will operate it to recover 
the investment and earn a reasonable return from the toll revenue during a set 
period. After that, the road will be reverted to public ownership. 
• Build-Own-Operate (BOO): Under this mode, a private sector is granted the 




project. The private sector partner owns the project outright, retains the 
operating revenue risk and all of the surplus operating revenue in perpetuity.  
Through the definition of the categories, we can find that from the Category 
Design-Bid-Build (DBB) to Category Build-Own-Operate (BOO), the public 
responsibilities decreases, while the private responsibilities increase. 
 
2.6 Risks Associated with Private Financing 
 
Transportation economists studying the interaction of economics and the law 
have long recognized that contracts play a key role in allocating the risk of any 
economic activity among the contracting parties. Public-private partnerships are no 
exception. One role of a public-private agreement is to determine how the risks 
inherent in a given transportation project will be distributed between the government 
and the private partner. Importantly, without some form of private participation, state 
and local governments by default bear almost all the risks associated with financing, 
designing, constructing, operating and maintaining a transportation asset.  
Traffic, revenue, or demand risks may be the most important economic risks 
associated with the design and construction of a new transportation facility, that is, 
with a private toll road. These are the risks that actual or realized traffic volumes, and 
thus revenues, will be less than projected at the time the facility was planned and 
constructed. These risks are important because they could impact the private partner’s 
financial viability, and its ability to repay its debt. In many public-private agreements, 




revenue. The private company therefore assumes demand risk. This is consistent with 
basic principles of efficient risk allocation, since private investors are usually highly 
diversified, assume demand risk voluntarily, and are compensated for this type of risk 
assumption. The risk of competing facility construction (normally addressed in the 
United States through non-compete clauses, as discussed below), is a subset of traffic 
or revenue risk, since a competing free facility may reduce traffic and thus revenues 
on the facility. The most common types of risks associated with private sector 
involvement into construction and operation of transportation facilities are the 
following: 
• Cost Overrun Risk: This is the risk that the actual cost of a transportation 
project will exceed its expected cost. There are a variety of risks associated 
with completing a transport facility that may cause costs to raise, such as 
unexpected geological conditions, problems in design, and increases in the 
cost of materials.  
• Time Overrun Risk: This is the risk that a project will take longer to design 
and construct than expected. This risk is sometimes conflated with cost 
overrun risk. Although it is obviously related to cost overruns, it is a distinct 
risk, since it is possible for a project to be completed on budget, but later than 
expected, which carries a unique set of hazards. If a project is delayed, 
motorists will be denied the use of the facility during the time delay. Those 
are not necessarily hazards associated with cost overruns.  
• Maintenance and Operation Risk: These include maintenance costs that are 




generally associated with the risk that road capacity might be unavailable. It 
includes roadway unavailability during winter due to snow and ice, as well as 
lack of availability due to staff management issues. 
• Financial Risk: This risk arises because the anticipated financing for the 
project might not materialize at the expected cost of finance. It includes not 
only risks associated with raising the necessary capital, but also exchange rate 
risks, interest rate risks, and insurance costs, among other sources.  
• Environmental Risk: This is the risk that the necessary environmental permits 
to construct the facility will not be forthcoming, and that costs associated with 
environmental mitigation will be higher than expected. It is usually relevant 
for a major expansion of an existing facility. 
• Regulatory Risk: This risk includes the possibility that regulations will 
adversely affect facility profitability. If, for example, a facility is rate-of-
return regulated, this includes the possibility that tolls will not be increased 
adequately to allow the operator to realize a market rate of return on their 
investment. It can also include changes in planning and environmental 
requirements. Also there is the possibility that the public sponsor will decide 
to cancel the project after bidding has been completed or after construction 
has begun.  
The key question that must be addressed in public-private partnerships is: 
which of these risks are best borne by investors and which by public sector in their 
capacity as transportation facility owners? There are two basic elements to risk 




remaining systematic risk via hedging and diversification. Investors may be better 
able to manage some risks while others are best borne by the public sector. The public 
agency may be better able to manage risks associated with regulatory and 
environmental risks, whereas private partners may be better positioned to manage 
financial risks.  
Although patterns are emerging, the contracting parties often determine the 
best allocation for the particular project at hand and given the prevailing capital 
market conditions. The optimal risk allocation across parties may vary across 
projects, jurisdiction, and time. The public sector might assume greater risk (such as 
assuming demand risk through shadow tolls or availability payments) in some cases 
in order to attract private investment and to realize the numerous other benefits 
associated with private participation. Risk sharing does in fact appear to vary widely 
across projects. As noted, under exclusive government operation public sector 
assumes almost the entire range of risks associated with facility design, construction, 
maintenance, expansion and operation.   
Risks transferred to the private sector are priced into the cost of the bid. The 
gains from risk sharing accrue from the fact that the private sector may be better at 
managing certain risks, so that the overall cost of risk management is reduced. The 
pricing of risk also helps to make the actual costs of risk more transparent. Some 
parties exposed to particular risks will be willing to pay a large sum to have those 
risks transferred to others. Other parties may be able to bear, or take actions to 
mitigate, those risks at a low cost and are thus willing to take them in return for some 




2.6.1 Sharing Risks through Non-Compete and Compensation Clauses 
A non-compete clause is a provision in a public-private contract that prohibits 
the public partner from constructing an unplanned government-supported 
transportation facility that would compete directly with the privately operated facility 
in question. The clause is intended to protect the private partner’s investment from 
competition from an unplanned competing facility. The issue of non-compete clauses 
was brought to the forefront of the U.S. PPP debate by the SR 91 Express Lanes in 
California.  
A less restrictive version of a non-compete clause has emerged both in the 
United States and abroad, called a compensation clause. In a compensation clause, the 
public partner may construct an unplanned competing facility but is required to 
compensate the private partner for revenues lost from the added competition. The 
Indiana Toll Road concession agreement for example requires the state to compensate 
the concessionaire for lost revenues if the state constructs, within 10 miles of the 
Indiana Toll Road, a new interstate-quality highway of 20 or more continuous miles. 
The economic rationale for such clauses is straightforward: both debt and 
equity investors will be loath to invest if they fear competition, and thus a loss of 
revenue, from a nearby government-supported facility. Non-compete clauses 
originally evolved to assure buyers of toll revenue bonds (both private and 
government issued) that traffic would not be diverted from the toll road, reducing its 
ability to repay that debt. The holders of any type of bond who anticipate being paid 
back via a facility’s toll revenue are likely to demand guarantees against unplanned 




United States, compensation clauses are another example of risk allocation through 
contracts. They attempt to address one type of event among many (the construction of 
a competing facility) that can affect the revenues accruing to a particular facility. 
Compensation clauses in the United States have been adjusted depending on the 
contractual setting. The Chicago Skyway agreement, for example, offers the 
concessionaire no protection against the construction of unplanned competing 
facilities. However, this may not reflect imprudent risk assumption by the 
concessionaire since dense urbanization near the Skyway makes competing facility 
construction costly.  
 
2.7 Previous Research on Roadway Privatization 
 
Research on the general topic of congestion pricing and toll road financing 
dates back to the early 20th century (e.g. Pigou 1920). Mohring and Harwitz (1962) 
have researched whether the revenue generated by the socially optimal toll charges 
can cover the optimal road investment and, i.e. the self-financing theorem. Small 
(1999) examined the conditions under which a congested facility is self-financing 
with nonlinear pricing. Yang and Meng (2002) showed that the self-financing 
theorem holds on a network of toll roads when each link is optimally priced and all 
capacities are optimized. Verhoef and Rouwendal (2004) addressed some 
implications of the first-best and second-best congestion pricing on the applicability 




When investing in toll roads, the private sector relies on future profitability of 
the toll roads to benefit financially. Viton (1995) assessed the economic viability of 
private roads for the situation where a private toll road competes with a free road. He 
concluded that private roads can be highly profitable under a range of assumptions 
about the mix of vehicle types and the costs of travel time, and presented a discussion 
of regulatory approaches to modify the impacts of simple profit-maximization. Mills 
(1995) discussed the possibility of divergence between profit and welfare objectives.  
Another research subject regarding private toll roads is the market of private 
toll roads, in particular the competition/complementarities between private roads and 
between public and private roads on a network. De Palma and Lindsey (2002) 
investigated whether private toll road operators will implement time-based congestion 
pricing in a competitive environment using Vickrey’s bottleneck model (Vickrey 
1969) and three types of routes: private roads, public roads, and free access roads. 
Several studies have investigated traffic patterns and economic welfare under various 
types of mixed-ownership schemes in parallel networks where links are substitutes 
for each other (de Palma 1992, Verhoef et al. 1996, Zhang and Levinson 2004, 2006, 
Zhang 2008). Previous research on revenue choices on a serial network managed by 
multiple jurisdictions (Levinson 1999, 2000, Small and Verhoef 2007, Verhoef 2007). 
have shown that if each link in a serial network is controlled by a different private 
operator, each private operator internalizes both the congestion externality of its own 
link and other links in setting the toll. Verhoef and Small (2004) examined the 
revenue-maximizing, first-best and second-best pricing schemes under user 




links. They showed that product differentiation mitigates the difference between the 
revenue-maximizing and the first-best results, and that user heterogeneity has more 
impact on the effectiveness of the second-best policies. Yang and Meng (2000) 
investigated the profitability and social welfare gain of a single new toll road in a 
general network through numerical experiments. Yang et al. (2002) further examined 
the impact of user heterogeneity on the profitability and social welfare gain of new 
toll roads.  
Several researchers have investigated transportation system privatization with 
a broader multimodal focus (i.e. not just roadways). Roth (1996) reviewed various 
aspects of road commercialization and privatization in the market economy 
conditions. Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) have reviewed transportation 
privatization at an empirical level. Kahn (1988) and Train (1991) studied the pros and 
cons of various ownership regimes based on the type of regulation. Winston and 
Shirley (1998) developed a quantitative model of the welfare effects of transportation 
privatization with emphasis on the transit system.   
 
2.8 Literature Review on Network Growth 
 
As acknowledged in previous research, the primary challenge in 
understanding the various ramifications of roadway privatization is to model the 
interdependencies among travel demand, roadway congestion, roadway capacity 
supply, pricing, and market entry decisions in a dynamic mixed-ownership network 




the future. Various methods have been adopted in previous research for study and 
modeling transportation network growth.   
Few researchers have considered the process of transportation network growth 
at microscopic level. Taaffe et al. (1963) studied the economic, political and social 
forces behind infrastructure expansion in underdeveloped countries. Their study finds 
that initial roads are developed to connect regions of economic activity and lateral 
roads are built around these initial roads. A positive feedback between infrastructure 
supply and population was also observed. Barker and Robbins (1975) investigated the 
London Underground’s growth, Miyao (1981) developed macroscopic models to take 
transportation improvements as either an endogenous effect of urban economy or as 
an exogenous effect on the economy. Endogenous growth theory suggests that 
economic growth is a two-way interaction between the economy and technology; 
technological research transforms the economy that finances it (Aghion and Howitt 
1998). The technology of transportation is unlikely to be an exception, suggesting 
transportation investment drives the growth that funds it. Macroscopically, the growth 
of infrastructure follows a logistic curve and that road infrastructure also has reached 
saturation levels in developed countries (Grübler 1990). Miyagi (1998) proposes a 
Spatial Computable General Equilibrium (SCGE) model interacting with a 
transportation model to study the interaction of transportation and the economy. 
Yamins et al. (2003) develop a road growth model to study co-evolution of urban 
settlements and road systems from an empty space with highly simplified travel 




and Marble (1965) observed that connections to the nearest large neighbor explained 
the sequence of rail network growth in Ireland.  
Carruthers and Ulfarsson (2001) find that various public service expenditures 
like roadways are influenced by demographic and political characteristics. The New 
Jersey Office of State Planning (1996) also finds a similar pattern in roadways 
expenditure. A related line of research examines how transportation investment 
affects the economy at large, but tends to treat transportation (or highways) as a black 
box, and makes no distinction between different kinds of highway investment 
(Aschauer 1989, Button 1998, Gramlich 1994, Nadiri and Mamuneas 1996). Boarnet 
(1997) is the most detailed of these types of studies, considering county level roads. 
The input is investment in transportation (or infrastructure), and output is gross 
domestic product, measured at the state or county level.   
In the last two decades the dynamic traffic assignment tools became highly 
popular for analyzing complex transportation systems. The concepts of preference or 
self-organization have been introduced to interpret network dynamics as a 
spontaneous process. In the first strand of research the focus was on describing 
network growth in stages, in the second - researchers constructed models that would 
replicate observed developed network patterns. However, these studies, originated by 
the interest to replicate the observation of network topologies, had to deal with simple 
networks using heuristic and intuitive rules for network growth and transformation 
due to the lack of understanding on the inherent mechanisms with regard to why and 
how transportation networks evolve. In recent years, solution algorithms to user 




(NDP). Typically the NDP is formulated as a bi-level framework in which the lower-
level represents the demand-performance equilibrium for given investment while the 
upper level represents the investment decision-making of the transport planner to 
maximize social welfare based on the unique equilibrium flow pattern obtained from 
the lower-level problem. If the NDP were how decisions are made, network changes 
would be due to planners’ rational behaviors to maximize the efficiency of a given 
network, measured according to some quantifiable objective, based on predicted 
traffic with budget and other constraints. Verhoef et al. (2004) explored the 
interrelations between pricing, capacity choice, and financing in a small network 
model; Zhang and Levinson (2005) proposed an analytic model discussing properties 
of long-run network equilibrium with regard to price and capacity with different small 
network layouts and ownership regimes. Levinson et al. (2003) focused on 
understanding the conditions under which new links could be constructed on a 
highway network as opposed to existing links being improved, and developed a 
model to predict the location of new highway construction based on the surrounding 
conditions of the new link, the estimated cost of construction, and a budget constraint. 
Levinson et al. (2007) incorporated jurisdictional planning processes to forecast 
network growth. In their attempts to predict the Twin-Cities seven-county road 
network 30 years from now, they developed network forecasting models with stated 
decision rules, processes encoded in flowcharts and weights developed from official 
documents or by discussion with agency staff. Montes de Oca and Levinson (2006) 
have shown that different levels of jurisdictions including the state (the Minnesota 




developed respective stated decision making processes in which federal or local 
funding are allocated to road projects prioritized according to their funding needs 
based on measured pavement quality, level of service, safety, and other conditions.   
Agent-based modeling, formalized first by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 
their work on self-reproducing automata (1944), provides an effective tool for 
capturing the various interactions between public/private roads and system users over 
time and across space. A number of transportation related agent-based applications 
already exist in the literature. Most of them are still under development or at the 
experimental stages, but they clearly demonstrate that implementing these methods has a 
significant potential to improve the performance of traffic and transportation systems. 
The applications of the agent-based models as well as related studies are reviewed in the 
following section. 
 
2.9 Agent-Based Modeling Applications in Transportation 
 
Kikuchi et al. (2002), Sanford Bernhardt (2007), and Chen and Cheng (2010) 
are examples of papers that review literature and examine how agent-based modeling 
is applied to transportation research. These reviews demonstrate that the most 
common applications of agent-based models in transportation are traffic or pedestrian 
simulation and demand modeling efforts.  
Traditionally, researchers have been using the four-step travel demand models 
for travel demand forecasting and network growth. As more and more research efforts 




agent-based models in travel demand modeling attracts increasing research interest. 
Some researchers focused on the departure time and route choice for a specific trip 
(most of the time the commute trip), and others investigated the more comprehensive 
activity patterns and the travel demand these activities generate. Departure time and 
route choice simulation models are traditionally connected with traffic assignment 
models with an explicit and detailed representation of the transportation network that 
is subject to congestion. Therefore travelers’ choice adjustment from day to day has 
been investigated since early days (see, e.g., Horowitz 1984; Cascetta and Cantarella, 
1991; Yang and Zhang 2009; Cominetti et al. 2010). Route and departure time choice 
have largely followed the utility-maximization paradigm in these so-called day-to-day 
“dis-equilibrium” models with a few exceptions including the “indifference band” 
theory (Mahmassani and Chang 1987) and the SILK-BUE model (Zhang 2006; 
Zhang 2007).  
Simulation-based dynamic traffic assignment models find it straightforward to 
apply the learning processes similar to those in Horowitz (1984) to simulated 
individuals. Examples are Ben-Akiva et al. (1991) (DynaMIT) and Emmerink et al. 
(1995). Both assume that a traveler updates travel times on experienced routes only. 
Ben-Akiva et al. (1991) assumes utility maximization, and Emmerink et al. (1995) 
utilizes the “indifference band” theory, which states that a traveler does not 
necessarily seek the optimum, and would stay on the current route if the change in 
travel time from consecutive days is not larger than a threshold. Jha et al. (1998) 
(DYNASMART) uses Baysian updating to update travel time perceptions for joint 




(2002) (DRACULA) has a similar link travel time updating mechanism and also 
assumes shortest path choice. Ettema et al. (2005) use reinforcement learning to 
update perceptions and assume utility maximization in a day-to-day departure time 
choice simulation. Nakayama et al. (2001) simulates a learning process in route 
choice by assuming drivers are choosing from a set of simple decision rules based on 
experience. Ozbay et al. (2001) use stochastic learning automata (SLA) to analyze 
drivers’ day-to-day route choice behavior. An internet based route choice simulator is 
developed to calibrate the model. The calibrated SLA model is applied to a simple 
transportation network to test if global user equilibrium, instantaneous equilibrium, 
and driver learning have occurred over a period of time. It is shown that the sample 
network converges to equilibrium, both in terms of global user and instantaneous 
equilibrium. Arentze and Timmermans (2005a) and the subsequent Han et al. (2008) 
deal with spatial knowledge learning explicitly. When making a trip, individuals 
make observations that may increase their knowledge about their environment. 
Arentze and Timmermans (2005a) develop a measure of expected information gain 
based on a Bayesian model of mental maps and belief updating. They argue that 
expected information gain is an element of the utility function of trip choice 
alternatives under conditions of limited information and learning. The simulations 
conducted illustrate that expected information gain tends to favor longer trips and 
variety seeking in terms of both route and destination choice. They argue, therefore, 
that individuals may perceive a positive utility of travel through environments with 
which they are less familiar. SILK-BUE is another simulation-based traffic 




without the perfect rationality assumption (i.e. complete information and utility 
maximization). Baysian learning is used to update perceptions of route attributes. 
Expected search gain is compared to search cost to determine whether a search will 
be per-formed at all. A search process is explicitly modeled for the generation of 
choice set. Search rules are represented by a decision tree generated from survey data, 
which determine whether an alternative will be considered. If an alternative is indeed 
going to be considered, another decision tree is applied to decide whether the traveler 
will switch to the new alternative. The traffic equilibrium under the adopted positive 
assumptions is defined as the Behavioral User Equilibrium at which the subjective 
search gain is lower than the perceived search cost for all users. Results suggest that 
normative assumptions, such as perfect information and unlimited human abilities to 
maximize utility, can produce significant prediction biases.  
With regard to agent-based activity models STARCHILD (Recker et al. 
1986a; Recker et al. 1986b) models the activity and travel scheduling decision as a 
classification and choice process, which is dependent on the basic concepts of utility 
maximization within a constrained environment, and results in observed 
travel/activity behavior. The key features are the detailed representation of constraints 
in the identification of alternatives, and the use of a classification method to generate 
the choice set. Also, SCHEDULER (Garling et al. 1994; Golledge et al. 1994) is one 
of the first computational process model (CPM) of activity-travel patterns. A CPM 
focuses on the process of making a decision, while the econometric approach such as 
utility maximization focuses on what factors affect the final choice but not how the 




Mobility Simulator) is a unique system in that it predicts the switch response to a 
policy change from a “baseline” activity schedule, which is an input to the model. A 
neural network is used to predict an output signal for each alternative, which is a 
scalar function of 36 decision-maker characteristics under the policy change. A 
multinomial logit model converts the output signals to probabilities by using the 
output signal as the only explanatory variable in the utility function. The parameters 
of the basic response model are estimated from data supplied by a policy specific 
stated preference survey. The switch decision is made with a satisfying rule, rather 
than utility maximization.  
Zhang and Levinson (2004) propose an agent-based travel demand model. In 
this model, three types of agents interact to one another: node, arc, and traveler. The 
goal of each traveler agent is to find and reach the activity with the lowest travel 
costs. Travelers move between nodes through the connecting arcs and decide to either 
accept or reject the opportunities at the nodes. During this search, they learn arc costs. 
They add this information to the exchangeable knowledge base as well. Similarly, 
node and arc agents also have specific properties and learning abilities. Along with 
these properties, some other interaction rules (including learning rules) complete the 
model. This framework enables the model to perform trip distribution and route 
assignment. Dia (2002) presents an agent-based approach to model dynamic driver 
behavior under the influence of real-time traffic information. For each form of the 
provided information (e.g. quantitative delay, predictive and prescriptive delay) to 
drivers, a number of multinomial logit models are developed to determine the factors 




determine the values of these factors. This evaluation is based on a field behavioral 
survey in a congested real-world commuting corridor. Based on these driver 
behavioral models and to evaluate the impacts of providing drivers with travel 
information, an agent-based framework for a microscopic traffic simulation tool is 
presented, which applies the Belief, Desire, and Intention (BDI) agent architecture.   
Another study which applies the BDI concept is Rossetti et al. (2002). They 
propose an extension to an existing microscopic simulation model called Dynamic 
Route Assignment Combining user Learning and micro-simulation (DRACULA). In 
this extension, the traffic domain is viewed as a multi-agent world and the behavior of 
agents is represented in terms of mental attitudes, which allow them to make 
decisions about route choice and departure time. The main part of this paper is 
concerned with the reasoning mechanism of drivers modeled by means of BDI 
architecture.  
Hao et al. (2010) focus on integration of an activity-based travel demand 
model, TASHA, with a dynamic agent-based traffic simulation model, MATSim. 
This research has two main objectives. The first is to develop an agent-based 
framework that includes both travel demand modeling and traffic assignment by 
integrating the above mentioned software. The second objective is to employ this 
newly integrated model in vehicle emission modeling. In this study, an iterative 
process is applied for the integration and a series of data conversions is proposed to 
make this process possible. The modeling framework is implemented to the greater 
Toronto area. Flötteröd et al. (2011) is another study which links the demand models 




demand models in the context of dynamic traffic assignment. Calibration refers to the 
estimation of the models’ parameters (such as the coefficients of a utility function) 
from time-dependent traffic counts. These parameters represent the simulated travel 
behavior.   
As can be seen, notable efforts have been dedicated to applying agent-based 
approach in transportation. Transportation systems consist of numerous intelligent agents 
such as travelers, drivers, and vehicles that interact with one another on various time 
scales in urban and regional systems, producing important and often complex system-
level patterns, such as travel demand and congestion, and agent-based modeling 




Many issues exist with regard to developing practical methods for evaluating 
network growth patterns and private toll road projects. While a number of previous 
studies have addressed these issues theoretically, few quantitative tools are available 
to decision makers who need reliable information on the impact of roadway 
privatization. There are large gaps between academic research and the practice of 
roadway privatization. In the U.S., state and local government officials, when 
considering individual private road projects, often rely on traffic and revenue 
estimates provided by consulting firms with their proprietary software and modeling 
tools. There is also a lack of understanding on the system-wide long-run impact of a 




privatization. In practice, it is usually important to determine the type and intensity of 
regulation on private-sector roadway investment. Proper and effective regulation is 
the key to compromising and aligning the private sector’s profit-maximizing 
objectives with the public sector’s welfare/user benefit maximizing objectives as well 









Chapter 3: Empirical Analysis of Investment Decision-




Transportation planning in the Washington DC-Baltimore region is a good 
example of multimodal and multi-jurisdictional transportation planning and 
investment processes. The region’s current transportation network is comprised of 
highways, arterial and local streets, managed lanes, Metro subway and commuter rail, 
extensive regional and local bus services, and three major airports (MWCOG 2008). 
Many agencies are involved in the regional planning process, including transportation 
departments in the District of Columbia, Maryland, Virginia, two large metropolitan 
planning organizations, regional and local transit authorities, and county and city 
planning agencies. The regional transportation system today is the result of previous 
investment decisions. These decisions are documented in long-range plans, mid-term 
transportation program reports, and short-term transportation improvement programs. 
However, often not documented very well is the decision-making process through 
which investment needs and projects are identified, candidate projects are prioritized, 
political considerations and technical merits are balanced, and conflicts between the 
objectives of different agencies are resolved.    
This chapter presents a qualitative analysis of the multimodal transportation 
investment decision rules and processes adopted by various jurisdictions in the 




at the county-, metropolitan-, state- and regional-level agencies. Findings from these 
interviews reveal the details of the investment process in this region, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of the existing processes and procedures.   
This chapter is organized as follows. Background information about 
transportation and planning agencies in the DC-Baltimore region and the overall 
decision-making structure is presented in Section 3.2.  Section 3.3 summarizes the 
interview methodology and general questions discussed during the agency interviews. 
Section 3.4 documents the interview findings, and analyzes the investment decision-
making processes within and between individual agencies. Section 3.5 discusses the 
pros and cons of the existing transportation investment process based on the interview 
findings, as well as possible alternative investment processes. Section 3.6 present 





The growth and decline of transportation networks result from a series of 
interdependent systems investment decisions (e.g. maintenance, capacity expansion) 
in response to changing travel demand and technology. Authorities making these 
investment decisions include federal, state and local government and planning 
agencies, which often share mobility, accessibility, and welfare objectives. However, 
agencies are most interested in the achievement of these objectives in their own 




multimodal and multijurisdictional reality sometimes fosters collaboration, but can 
also create funding competition between agencies as the total amount of 
transportation funds for a region is often fixed. Transportation revenues in the DC-
Baltimore area traditionally come from different sources including federal grants, 
user fees, fuel taxes, local revenues, bond sales, and are held in state transportation 
trust funds. Like many other regions in the US, rising costs, stagnating revenue, and 
greater needs in the DC-Baltimore area have created a transportation investment 
environment where priorities are given to system preservation, maintenance, and 
safety needs, and major new initiatives and capital programs have to be scaled back. 
Cities, counties, states, and modal agencies are all concerned with funding operational 
and capital needs in the transportation system in times of limited budgets. In such a 
situation, to achieve the greatest investment returns, it could be beneficial to 
implement new investment frameworks in order to meet the target levels of system 
performance, as suggested by Oh and Kumares (2009). Different organizational 
structures, such as independent Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) in 
Florida (2007) or more powerful regional MPOs, or DOT-oriented schemes may have 
different implications on the efficiency and equity of transportation investments. 
While changing the existing organizational structure is difficult and a long-term issue, 
a critical routine task for transportation planning agencies is to coordinate 
transportation investment and maximize overall system effectiveness under the 
existing organization structure.   
One may argue that the goal of maximizing transportation investment returns 




would be more or less achievable if the transportation system in a region is 
completely controlled by a powerful centralized agency. In reality, there are often 
many jurisdictions and agencies involved. This is particularly true for the DC-
Baltimore region. The key players in the region are DC, Maryland, and Virginia 
Departments of Transportation (DOTs), state transportation modal agencies (e.g. 
State Highway Administration, and Transit Administration in Maryland), 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments (MWCOG) that includes the 
MPO for the DC metropolitan area – DC Transportation Planning Board (TPB),  
Baltimore Metropolitan Council (BMC) that includes the MPO for the Baltimore 
metropolitan area – Baltimore Regional Transportation Board (BRTB), several 
smaller MPOs in Maryland and Virginia, Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority 
(WMATA) – the regional transit authority, as well as county and city planning 
agencies. Figure 3-1 illustrates the relationship among these agencies and how in 
general transportation needs are identified (dashed arrows) and funds allocated (solid 
arrows) by these agencies. DOTs are largely responsible for expanding and 
maintaining the major highway systems and supporting public transit in the region 
(MWCOG 2008). DOTs are the main recipients of Federal Highway Trust Fund 
dollars and state transportation funds, which are then distributed to all modes of 
transportation. In the DC-Baltimore region, three state DOTs participate in the 
planning and investment processes: Virginia DOT (VDOT), Maryland DOT (MDOT) 






Figure 3-1: Washington DC - Baltimore Region Key Transportation Agencies 
Interactions 
 
Although the District of Columbia is not a state, DDOT is officially 
recognized by the federal government as a state DOT. DDOT has responsibility for 
the federal interstate highways within the District’s boundaries as well as local streets 
and roads. MDOT manages all state highways through its State Highway 
Administration (SHA), and state transit facilities through Maryland Transit 
Administration (MTA). WMATA operates the Metrorail subway system, Metrobus 
regional bus transit system, and MetroAccess on-demand bus service. Many 
jurisdictions of Virginia and Maryland support their local bus services in addition to 
WMATA systems. 
The majority of funding for the region comes from federal and state sources. 
These funds are allocated through the state budgeting process in the state legislatures. 




improvement budgets for transportation to their state legislatures. These budgets 
include state and local tax revenues, bond sales and federal funds that have been 
apportioned to the states on a formula basis. Using the governor’s budget as a starting 
point, each state legislature enacts a spending bill for transportation. In general, some 
transportation funding is allocated according to predetermined formulas and in other 
cases projects are funded individually due to strong promotion by interest groups. In 
the District of Columbia the mayor submits a budget to the D.C. Council that includes 
transportation funding. But unlike Maryland and Virginia, the District submits its 
spending bill directly to the U.S. Congress for approval. 12 
Each state and the District, as well as the MPOs, transportation modal 
agencies, and local government agencies, have their own planning and investment 
processes. Although the final investment decisions are specified in long-range plans 
and transportation improvement programs, the main goal of this empirical analysis is 
to identify the political and technical factors that drive the decision-making process, 
and how various agencies at different levels interact and collectively allocate 
transportation funds based on these factors in the DC-Baltimore region.   Since 
investment decisions determine the shape of future transportation network, 
understanding the existing investment process is necessary for planner who wants to 
shape future transportation systems. A previous study in Minnesota has analyzed the 
highway investment process in the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area (Montes 
de Oca, Levinson 2006). As the transportation investment processes are documented 
for more regions, comparison of different investment processes will become possible, 






In person interviews have been conducted with the staff of two MPOs (TPB in 
DC, and BRTB in Baltimore), Maryland DOT, Maryland State Highway 
Administration (SHA), Prince George’s County and Montgomery County in 
Maryland, and the regional transit agency WMATA. While the in-person interviews 
focus more on agencies in Maryland, planning documents published by agencies in 
the District of Columbia and Virginia are also used for this study. In order to gather 
first-hand information on both documented and undocumented investment 
procedures, staff members in these agencies who directly participate in or supervise 
the planning and investment decision-making processes are chosen for the interviews. 
All but one interview involve multiple planners from the same agency. The interview 
procedure is similar to what is used in a previous study by Montes de Oca and 
Levinson in Minnesota (2006). The main objectives for the interviews were to 
identify:  
• Agencies’ main priorities and criteria that guide investment processes;  
• Procedures for identifying needs and generating candidate projects; 
• Procedure for selecting/prioritizing candidate projects;  
• Methods for quantitative technical project evaluation, and the role of  non-
technical  political influences; 
• Procedures for agency interactions concerning needs identification and 




The interviews were digitally recorded with the permission from interview 
participants. After interview request was approved by an agency, a list of interview 
questions were sent to all interview participants before the actual interview. This list 
of questions was customized for each agency based on its jurisdictional oversight, 
unique interactions with other agencies, and modes of transportation under its 
supervision. In general, the following core questions were asked at all interviews.   
1. What is the current method for identifying transportation needs?  
2. What is the current procedure for identifying and selecting projects?  
3. How are candidate transportation projects generated?  
4. What is the institutional procedure for proposing transportation projects?  
5. What are the most important performance measures (e.g. safety, road 
conditions, and pavement conditions, capacity), or investment criteria that are 
considered in the project selection process? 
6. What are the policy initiatives that influence transportation investment? 
7. What quantitative scoring and ranking method (if any) does the agency use for 
transportation project selection? 
8. What qualitative project prioritization method (if any) does the agency use? 
9. How are transportation funds for different modes (e.g. highway and transit) 
allocated?  
10. How is funding allocated among different types of transportation 





11. What are the sources of funding for transportation projects? How do the 
federal, state, and/or local agencies share project costs?  
12. How does the agency collaborate with other agencies in the region? 
13. What is the role of political considerations in the transportation investment 
process? 
14. What is the role of public opinions in the transportation investment process? 
 
3.4 Current Transportation Investment Decision-Making in the 
Washington DC Region 
 
The following subsections summarize the transportation investment process of 
each interviewed agency, and the interactions among these agencies.  
3.4.1 DC Transportation Planning Board 
Transportation Planning Board (TPB) is the metropolitan planning 
organization that brings together key decision-makers in the Washington DC area to 
coordinate planning and funding for the region’s transportation system. The TPB 
became associated with the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments 
(MWCOG) in 1966. MWCOG was established by local cities and counties to deal 
with regional concerns including growth, housing, environment, public health and 
safety, as well as transportation. Although the TPB is an independent body, its staff is 
provided by MWCOG Department of Transportation Planning. The TPB’s planning 
area covers the District of Columbia and surrounding jurisdictions within the 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The TPB’s decision-makers are mayors, city 




and Virginia DOTs, regional transit agency (WMATA), and the state legislatures. The 
TPB also includes non-voting representatives from key federal agencies, the 
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA) and the TPB’s Private 
Providers Task Force (MWCOG 2008).  
The TPB’s planning process is schematically represented on Figure 3-2. Even 
though the TPB represents so many jurisdictions, it does not have direct control over 
transportation funding resources (they are mainly allocated by state DOTs as 
discussed later) and is not responsible for construction or maintenance of the 
transportation system. Nonetheless, the key transportation agencies in the region are 
required to submit project proposals to the TPB for conformity analysis. The TPB’s 
role is to produce two regional planning documents: the financially Constrained 
Long-Range Transportation Plan (CLRP) and the Transportation Improvement 
Program (TIP) for the metropolitan Washington area, which both comply with 
environmental goals for the region. The CLRP uses a planning horizon of 25-30 
years. In order to receive federal funding, transportation projects must be included in 
the CLRP and the TIP. Individual agencies that submit project proposals to TPB are 
responsible for the funding of the projects.   
Project developments for the CLRP and the TIP occur at the state and local 
levels. The District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia each controls its own 
funding streams and each has its own system for prioritizing projects. In general, the 
TPB has little influence on the types of projects incorporated into the plans unless that 




proposed to remove state-sponsored projects from the long-range plan, because the 
states provide their own funding sources for the projects.   
The TIP includes all the regionally-significant projects that the states and 
other jurisdictions have programmed and approved for the next six years. Like the 
CLRP, the TIP is subject to federal review and must meet air quality conformity 
requirements. The CLRP and the TIP are updated on an annual basis. Each state and 
other participating agencies in the region have their own procedures for developing 
projects for the TIP, which is described later in this section. 
 
Figure3-2: The TPB Investment Decision-Making Processes 
 
3.4.2 Baltimore Regional Transportation Board 
The Baltimore Regional Transportation Board (BRTB) is the MPO for the 




of Annapolis and Baltimore, five counties in the metro area, Maryland DOT, 
Maryland Department of the Environment, and the Maryland Department of Planning 
respectively. The BRTB provides overall program management and oversight in the 
development of the federally mandated LRP and the TIP. For budget allocation 
purposes, there is a designated Budget Subcommittee that annually reviews and 
prioritizes projects. The current working plan is the Transportation Outlook 2035. It is 
the LRP for the Baltimore region prepared by the BRTB with support from the 
Baltimore Metropolitan Council (BMC). This long-range planning effort focuses on 
three categories of transportation needs: congestion management, economic growth in 
the region, and meeting future travel demand. The Board does not generate its own 
revenues, and all transportation funds for projects in the LRP come from MDOT. The 
BRTB gets its share of funds for project is the LRP when the regional plan is updated.  
The scheme of the BRTB investment process is presented in Figure 3-3.  
The BRTB receives funding for two project categories: regionally significant 
projects and local projects (BMC 2007a). Local jurisdictions, such as counties in the 
Baltimore metro area, can submit projects in both categories. Regionally significant 
projects are classified as “critically important to all jurisdictions in the region”. These 
projects must meet a set of criteria and are not subject to the technical or policy-based 
prioritization process. These projects require coordination between local, regional and 
state organizations, and incorporate public inputs at all planning stages. There are five 
criteria for each transportation mode that a regionally significant project has to meet 




Regionally significant projects receive priority in the transportation 
investment process. The remaining transportation funds are then allocated to local 
projects. Local projects are projects that are proposed by a local jurisdiction to meet 
the needs in that jurisdiction, which may not have significant system-wide benefits. 
Although local jurisdictions may provide full, partial, or none cost sharing for 
local project, all local projects go through the BRTB project prioritization process in 
order to qualify for federal funding. First, the BRTB sets the prioritization check-list 
with a set of criteria for candidate projects based on regional planning goals. Each 
local jurisdiction (city, county) can submit five high-priority projects, four medium-, 
and any number of low-priority projects. Higher-priority projects have more weights 
in the BRTB project prioritization process, as shown in Figure 3-3. These weights 
represent a mechanism through which regional and local planning priorities are 
jointly considered. Local jurisdictions only perform policy evaluation (in contrast to 
technical evaluation) and rank their local projects based on what they think are most 
important for the respective local jurisdictions. After local projects are submitted to 
BRTB, they are subject to a quantitative technical evaluation process. Local policy 
evaluation accounts for 60 percent of the final project score in the prioritization 
process, while the technical evaluation accounts for the remaining 40 percent (BMC 
2007c). The criteria and measures for policy and technical evaluation, as well as their 
weights are summarized in Table 3-1. The prioritized project lists are determined for 
each mode of transportation separately, so there is no competition between different 
modes of transportation at this stage of the planning process (BMC 2007d). Budget 











When policy and technical evaluations are completed, projects ranked the 
highest for each transportation mode will receive federal and state funding support. If 
a local jurisdiction proposes a project but the project does not rank high enough, the 
local jurisdiction may provide partial or full funding support and in doing so increase 
the rank of that particular project. 
 
3.4.3 Maryland Department of Transportation 
Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) is comprised of several 
modal administrations responsible for individual transportation modes. The State 
Highway Administration (SHA) is primarily responsible for the planning, design, 
construction, and maintenance of Maryland’s Interstate and state highways. The 
Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) oversees public transportation. MTA 
operates and maintains the Maryland Rail Commuter (MARC) service that runs 
commuter trains connecting DC, Baltimore, Montgomery and Frederick counties, and 
West Virginia. MTA also operates commuter and local buses in the DC-Baltimore 
region, as a supplement to WMATA’s Metro subway and Metro bus services. Other 
MDOT modal agencies include the Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA), which 
owns and operates BWI Thurgood Marshall Airport, the Maryland Transportation 
Authority (MdTA), which is responsible for toll facilities, the Maryland Port 




Policy Prioritization Technical Prioritization 
Criteria Points Criteria Points 
Safety  Highways and Interchanges  
Reduce fatalities and injuries 0 - 5 Crash frequency 0 - 10 
Enhance mobility/reduce congestion  0 - 5 Crash severity 0 - 10 
Improve intersections 0 - 5 Congestion (peak congestion per day) 0 - 15 
Safety for pedestrians, bicyclists 0 - 5 Demand (peak one hour volume per lane) 0 - 15 
System Operations  Accessibility (travel time savings) 0 - 10 
Efficiency, performance 0 -10 Capital cost effectiveness 0 - 8 
Real-time information for transportation operations 0 -10 Operating and maintenance cost effectiveness 0 - 7 
Accessibility  Road Connectivity 0 - 7 
Access to transportation network 0 - 4 Transit Connectivity 0 - 3 
Mobility to persons with special needs 0 - 4 Air quality benefit 0 - 10 
Increase of transport choices 0 - 4 Natural resources 0 - 5 
Access to tourist attractions 0 - 4 Total Points 100 
Access and efficient movement of freight 0 - 4 Rail Transit Evaluation  
Environmental quality  Safety 0 - 5 
Achievement of air quality targets 0 - 8 Congestion 0 - 10 
Sustaining/cleaning the Chesapeake Bay 0 - 5 Demand (number of riders per mile) 0 - 15 
Efficient use of energy resources 0 - 2 Job accessibility 0 - 15 
Preservation of natural and cultural resources 0 - 5 Mode shift from highway to transit 0 - 10 
System Security Improvement  Capital cost effectiveness 0 - 10 
Coordination between transportation and non-
transportation response agencies 
0 - 6 Operating and maintenance cost effectiveness 0 - 5 
Security of critical transportation infrastructure 0 - 6 Intraregional transit connectivity 0 - 15 
Operation of transportation system 0 - 7 Interregional transit connectivity 0 - 10 
 





Policy Prioritization Technical Prioritization 
Criteria Points Criteria Points 
Link Transport Planning with Land Use and 
Economic Development 
 Air quality benefit 0 - 3 
Integrated land development with alternative driving 
options 
0 - 4 Natural resources 0 - 2 
Enhancement of infrastructure in designated Priority 
Funding Areas 
0 - 8 Total Points 100 
Preserving existing communities 0 - 2 Bicycle and Pedestrian evaluation criteria  
Access to business and employment opportunities 0 - 2 Demand 0 - 40 
Community revitalization 0 - 2 Transportation need 0 - 25 
Regional labor market expansion 0 - 2 Bike/pedestrian stress level 0 - 25 
Inter-Jurisdictional Participation and Cooperation  Directness 0 - 10 
Supporting regional needs and priorities 0 - 7 Total Points 100 
Reflection of local needs and priorities 0 - 10   
Consensus opinion of key interest groups 0 - 3 
Total Points 140 
 






MDOT has a somewhat unusual system for funding transportation projects. 
The state’s Transportation Trust Fund (TTF) is a unified pot of money that provides 
MDOT the flexibility to fund high-priority projects across the state regardless of 
transportation modes. Local roads in Maryland are controlled and maintained by 
cities and counties. Also, MDOT provides Maryland’s entire share of funding for the 
regional transit system in the DC area (see Section 3.4.7 on WMATA for more 
details). Figure 3-4 illustrates MDOT’s TTF allocation between jurisdictions and 
modes in the state. TTF is first divided into separate funds to meet different 
transportation needs categories (e.g. maintenance, capital programming), and then 
allocated to different modal agencies, which is then subject to the investment process 
of these modal agencies.  
 




3.4.4 Maryland State Highway Administration 
Maryland State Highway Administration received highway transportation 
funds from MDOT, and works with MPOs and local jurisdictions to allocate funds to 
meet highway preservation and capital programming needs. In the last two decades, 
system preservation projects have received higher and higher share of SHA’s 
transportation funds due to aging infrastructure, and this trend is likely to continue in 
the future. The Administration identifies system maintenance and preservation needs 
through an internal technical evaluation process, and has created a large number of 
funding categories for different preservation and maintenance needs. For instance, 
SHA performs technical evaluation of pavement and bridge conditions every year, 
and has set the goal of keeping 84% of pavements under “acceptable conditions”. 
While pavement and bridge maintenance consumes the majority of SHA’s system 
preservation budget, there are also 24 smaller funding categories dedicated to specific 
needs including drainage, traffic signs, and community improvement. For capital 
improvement and system expansion projects, SHA coordinates with six MPOs 
(already discussed in previous sections) and local jurisdictions (through a priority-
letter process discussed below and in Section 3.4.5)   
The SHA transportation investment process centers on MPO-level 
Transportation Improvement Programs (TIPs) and the statewide Consolidated 
Transportation Program (CTP). TIPs represent projects within the boundary of each 
MPO, and SHA provides technical assistance with those projects upon request. TIPs 
consist of projects funded by federal money and matching state/local contributions. 




Transportation Trust Fund. There is a financially unconstrained predecessor to the 
CTP, often referred to as the 20-year state Highway Needs Inventory (HNI). The HNI 
is a technical document (based on performance/condition monitoring and travel 
demand forecasts) that identifies all required highway improvements as well as safety 
and structural problems on the existing highway facilities. Usually, only “serious” 
projects from the HNI undergo detailed engineering planning phases and cost 
estimation procedures. The HNI lists only major capital improvement projects (i.e. no 
system preservation projects), and is the main source of candidate projects for the 
SHA transportation investment process. Another source of candidate projects is the 
priority letters submitted to SHA by individual counties in Maryland. Priority letters 
represent each county’s internal ranking of projects based on local needs and local 
inputs.    
All candidate projects for capital improvement from HNI and county priority 
letters are evaluated by SHA planners based on three main investment criteria: safety, 
congestion mitigation, and support for economic development, though there is no 
formal quantitative evaluation procedure.  NEPA (National Environmental Policy 
Act) and political considerations also play a role in this prioritization process, though 
the actual influence of these two factors can only be analyzed on a project-by-project 
basis. Although there is a formal procedure for SHA to discuss project prioritization 
with counties each Fall (known as the Fall county tour during which MDOT and SHA 
engineers and planners visits each county and hold public meetings; there are also 
meetings between SHA and local jurisdiction representatives before the tour), it is 




SHA. If a project proposed by a county meets all SHA requirements but does not 
receive enough federal or state funding to be included into the CTP, the county may 
“come to the table” and share the cost with SHA. Typically, only the counties with 
high levels of economic development (e.g. Montgomery and Howard counties) 
participate financially as project sponsors. After needs-based analysis and 
negotiations with counties are completed, SHA submits the draft CTP each year to the 
MDOT Secretary, which may be revised and then submitted to Maryland State 
Legislature for possible further revisions and budget approval. Revisions to CTP at 
these later stages often originate from political influences and changes in budgetary 
situations. The complete process for SHA investment process including interactions 
with counties and MPOs are shown in Figure 3-5.   
 
3.4.5 Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties 
All counties and City of Baltimore in Maryland participate in the State and 
MPO transportation planning process. These local jurisdictions often have their own 
local transportation processes. County- and city-level priorities may differ from 
MPO- and state-level priorities. The influence of local priorities in the MPO and state 
transportation investment processes often depends on local jurisdictions’ own 
financial capability and the urgency of local transportation needs as determined by the 











Two counties have been interviewed so far, which have different economic 
conditions: Montgomery County which is the third richest county in the nation, and 
Prince George’s County which is doing well economically by national standards but 
has relatively lower level of economic development compared to Montgomery 
County.   Figure 3.6 summarizes the transportation investment processes in these two 
counties, and their relationships with the MPO and state investment processes.   
Prince George’s and Montgomery Counties both submit County Priority 
Letters with eligible projects to the SHA to qualify for federal funding. The projects 
that can be included in the Priority Letters are projects related to new economic 
development, bridge projects, safety or capacity expansion projects on State highways 
or county roads intersecting with State highways, or projects with strong political 
support. Not all counties received equal share of the state transportation trust funds 
for their projects. Information gathered during the interviews suggest that in 2008 
none of the project in Prince George’s County priority letter was funded by the state 
transportation investment process, while a number of projects in Montgomery County 
priority letter were funded. Although this may be explained by higher levels of 
economic development and greater transportation needs in Montgomery County, this 
could create tensions between state and local agencies. Local jurisdictions that receive 
less funding naturally would want more direct local control of transportation funding 






Figure 3-6: Prince George's and Montgomery County Planning Processes  
 
Along with the statewide CTP investment process, the Prince George’s 
County produces a list of its own high priority projects in the county planning 
process. These projects go into the county Capital Improvement Program (CIP) and 
are not related to the county priority letter. The CIP is a six-year plan for the 
providing new facilities and meeting infrastructure needs within the county, and is 
fully supported by county funds (bonds 35%, Federal and State aids 33%, developer 
contributions and other sources). Candidate projects for the CIP are proposed based 
on county planning model forecasts, public opinions, and county engineers’ 




costs. Political considerations in the county also have strong influence in the county 
investment process in terms of project proposition and ranking outcomes. Due to 
limited county transportation funds, safety needs override other needs if there is a 
competition for funds.  In addition, system preservation needs override all capital 
improvement needs. New roadways in the Prince George’s County are constructed 
only by developers at this time. Local bus services in the county are supported by 
Federal subsidies which are shared with other counties in Maryland (see Section 4.6 
for more details on Maryland transit investment processes). Also, some funds for 
transit operations come from transit tax and the fare box.  
Montgomery County currently has no comprehensive transportation 
investment process other than the Priority Letter process. Its capital improvement 
needs are partially funded by the State. Montgomery County receives a larger share of 
the state TTF than other counties. This is because the State views Montgomery 
County as an economic engine in the state, and businesses only pay property taxes to 
the county, and other taxes to the State. The county’s operational and maintenance 
needs are funded by local resources. The State also provides funding for Montgomery 
County’s transit system as well. Under special circumstances, County districts may 
exercise taxes or issue bonds to raise revenue and finance local projects. While the 
county publishes an annual report on the most congested roads, the investment 
priority is given to new developments that demands new roadway facilities. Capacity 
issues on existing road are addressed only if there is remaining revenue. The county 




Apparently, supporting new economic development is the focus of the transportation 
investment process in Montgomery County.  
 
3.4.6 Maryland Transit Administration 
The Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) is a modal agency under MDOT 
with oversight responsibility for transit operations in all areas in Maryland (MTA 
2007). The core MTA transit service is bus transit. For instance, the MTA operates 78 
local, express, and commuter bus routes throughout the Baltimore area. MARC rail 
service primarily accommodates commuting needs between Washington DC and 
Baltimore, and between DC and Montgomery and Fredrick counties.  
Transit funding and management in Maryland is predominantly State function. 
Transit systems are funded through the State’s TTF. Transit typically receives 35% of 
total MDOT budget (MTA 2007) for operational and capital improvement needs. 
MDOT allocates money for transit operating and capital needs separately, which 
means that capital improvement projects do not directly compete with operational 
needs for funding at the project level. Capital expenditures are used for construction, 
equipment, vehicles, fuel, stations, and other supporting facilities. Operating 
expenditures defray personnel, maintenance, preservation, and other employee-related 
costs. Currently, transit investment comprises half of the State’s transportation 
operating/maintenance budget and about 30% of the State’s capital improvement 






Figure 3-7: MTA Budget Allocation Process 
 
For capital improvement projects, MTA provides only 20% of total funding 
with Federal grants covering the rest.  Federal transit fund is divided into several 
different grant programs with each program targeting a different transit market. 
However, Federal grants may or may not be available in a year depending on the 
Federal budget and ongoing major transit projects in the state. Due to the current 
budgetary situation, transit investment is largely based on needs analysis for routing 
investment decision-making. There are no major capital improvement projects. When 
there are major capital improvement projects, they usually rely on dedicated funding 




new transit projects, which is a rare scenario when a systematic transit investment 
process is required. A procedure for extensive public involvement and decision-
making based on public surveys was developed to help allocate transit investment 
funds. Due to the length restriction on this paper, the details of that procedure will be 
presented in a subsequent paper.     
 
3.4.7 Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) operates 86 
metro subway stations with a 106-mile subway network, and provides three types of 
transit services: Metrorail subway, Metrobus regional bus, and MetroAccess 
paratransit (WMATA 2008a). WMATA transit services cover the District of 
Columbia, and many counties and cities in Maryland and Virginia. WMATA is 
governed by its Board of Directors, which consists of 12 members representing 
different jurisdictions in the Washington metropolitan area.  
Metro’s annual budget consists of three budgets: reimbursable-projects 
budget, operating budget, and capital budget (WMATA 2008b). The reimbursable 
projects are the services or programs for which separate funding has been arranged. 
The most common of these projects are expanded bus services paid for by one of 
Metro’s state and local government partners. The operating budget’s focus is on the 
cost of operations, expanding services to meet growing demand, and improving 
efficiency of services. Funding for the operating budget comes primarily from 
passenger fares and advertisements in the Metro (about half) and subsidies from 




allocated using six subsidy-allocation formulas for regional buses, non-regional 
buses, rail, paratransit, and debt services (WMATA 2008b). The capital budget 
focuses on new infrastructure needs, including Metro’s buses, rail cars, stations, track, 
maintenance facilities, power systems, etc. About half of the capital budget comes 
from federal government, and the other half is from Metro’s state and local 
jurisdictions.  
WMATA’s Office of Long-Range Planning is developing a new Capital 
Improvement Program (CIP) for the years of 2011 to 2020. The new CIP has four 
program elements (WMATA 2008b). 
1. Infrastructure Renewal Program maintains, rehabilitates, and replaces Metro 
subway facilities.  
2. Eight-Car Train Capital Initiative allows Metrorail to have fifty percent of 
its peak hour trains operating in an eight-car configuration, which increase 
system capacity.  
3. Bus Improvement Capital Initiative is for increasing bus fleet of the 
Metrobus system.  
4. Program Management funds general and program administration costs for the 
CIP.  
In order to maintain a comprehensive inventory of capital improvement needs, 
WMATA also develops the Capital Needs Inventory (CNI) to address performance, 
demand and customer needs. The CNI is generated based on outreach to each 
WMATA department, life-cycle costs, current conditions, future demand, and 




conditions and life expectancy of different projects and that is used for generating and 
selecting projects for the CNI. The WMATA transit investment process is 
summarized in Figure 3-8.  
The metropolitan transportation planning model at MWCOG provides future 
transit demands to assist WMATA in transit investment decision-making.   The main 
demand/congestion measure for the Metro rail system is the passenger load at a 
maximum load point. WMATA also measures the passenger loads on different 
stations and routes to determine how level of service matches the established 
standards, and if the number of people per rail car is under certain threshold. The 
performance measures for improving bus services are: customer complaints, travel 
time, and ridership increase. These performance measures are used to prioritize transit 
capacity investment projects at WMATA. Recently, WMATA has adopted a 
systematic project prioritization process based on system monitoring and expert 












3.5 Discussion on Existing and Alternative Investment Processes 
Several interesting observations in the existing transportation investment 
process in the Washington DC-Baltimore region are discussed in this section, as well 
as alternative investment procedures that deserve further analysis in future research.  
 
3.5.1 Multiple State and Local Jurisdictions 
Transportation investment in the Washington DC-Baltimore region involves 
three state DOTs, two large MPOs, six small MPOs, more than a dozen counties, and 
regional and state transit authorities. There could be a large number of alternative 
organization structures that allocate different levels of decision-making power to 
different agencies. The existing investment process favors state DOTs and regional 
transit agencies. The large MPOs primarily provide technical assistance. For 
metropolitan areas that cross state boundaries such as Washington DC, a stronger 
MPO should result in an investment process that can better address critical 
transportation issues in the metro area that are not regarded as urgent by all state 
agencies (DC, MD and VA).  
In addition, the needs of local jurisdictions that may not be obvious at the 
regional and state levels are often not met. This creates tension between state DOTs 
and many local jurisdictions, and between local jurisdictions themselves. There exists 
the perception that transportation funds are not distributed fairly. The state-county 
priority letter process in this region provides a platform for communication, 
coordination, and cooperation. However, in the end, it is the agency that has direct 




where MPOs or local jurisdictions have more influence in the project selection 
process. The merits and pitfalls of these alternative organizational structures should 
be evaluated. The research question is – do we need more centralized or more 
decentralized transportation investment process?    
From an efficiency point of view, an objective that appears proper is to create 
an institutional structure that can best address critical transportation problems in the 
region. If the major transportation issues are region-wide and state-wide issues, it 
makes sense to strengthen state DOTs and regional planning organizations. The trend 
of incorporating environmental and sustainability objectives into transportation 
planning and investment should favor a more centralized approach toward 
transportation planning. On the other hand, equity considerations and the fact that 
local issues are best understood by local agencies suggest local jurisdictions should be 
involved in the investment process. There is proposal for local jurisdictions to be able 
to directly compete for federal funding without going through the state DOTs.  This is 
an interesting and practical scenario, but its impact needs to be analyzed.   
 
3.5.2 Multimodal Transportation Investment 
Multimodal transportation planning has received significant attention lately. 
Historically, highway and transit projects have their own separate funding resources, 
and at the project level there is no competition between highway and transit projects. 
This is also the case in the DC-Baltimore area where funding allocation between 
multiple transportation modes occurs at the highest level of the planning process. 




alternatives is apparent, to change the existing process and to allow more completion 
between multimodal alternatives based on cost-effectiveness would require some 
restructuring within or between the existing transportation agencies. For instance, 
integrated corridor planning at state DOTs and MPOs represents an opportunity to 
encourage the comparison of highway, transit, and operational alternatives at the 
corridor level. There could still be separate funds for different modes, but the actual 
allocation of transportation revenue to different models in a region may depend on the 
outcome of corridor- or project-level scenario analysis.  Improved communication 
between state DOTs, MPOs and regional transit agencies should also improve 
multimodal transportation investments. For instance, WMATA, being a regional 
transit agency, has no interests in comparing transit and highway alternatives. State 
DOTs and MPOs may conduct multimodal analysis, make project recommendations 
to WMATA, and incorporate the outcomes of such analysis in the determination of 
state contributions to the WMATA budget.  
 
3.5.3 System Preservation versus Capacity Improvement 
Our interviews in the DC-Baltimore area reveal that in an era of needs-budget 
gap, all agencies have decided to give priority to system preservation needs, and only 
allocate the remaining revenue to system capital improvement projects. This is 
relatively uncontroversial as the life-cycle cost of postponing necessary system 
preservation activities can only be higher. Agencies have seen larger and larger share 
of their resources dedicated to system preservation needs, due to aging transportation 




improvement funding is expected to worsen mobility and accessibility in the long run. 
While resolving the funding issue is way beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth 
mentioning that not all existing facilities should be maintained at the current level of 
service. For instance, it may not be cost-effective to maintain a local or rural road that 
has very low volumes at a high level of service. Degenerating certain segments of the 
existing transportation system may become a good decision as demand patterns 
change over time.      
 
3.5.4 Qualitative and Quantitative Methods for Project Prioritization 
Qualitative project prioritization is more flexible in considering policy 
initiative and political factors, and therefore valued by all local, metropolitan, and 
state agencies in the DC-Baltimore region. Quantitative methods are often adopted by 
agencies for the technical evaluation of candidate projects (e.g. impact on safety and 
congestion). Several agencies indicated at the interviews that they would like to either 
introduce or strengthen objective quantitative procedures in their investment decision-
making processes (e.g. BRTB, Prince George’s County, WMATA), while other 
agencies do not see an imperative need in changing the current qualitative methods 
(e.g. SHA, Montgomery County).  All agencies acknowledge that an exclusively 
quantitative procedure will not meet their needs and objectives. The BRTB process 
assigns explicit weights to policy/political consideration and technical evaluation 
scores, which represent a transparent way of balancing political and technical factors. 
There have been interests among academic researchers in applying multi-objective 




Such attempts should take into consideration agencies’ desire for some flexibility, and 
the multi-jurisdictional and multimodal nature of transportation investment.      
 
3.5.5 Transportation Investment Criteria 
For capacity expansion and capital improvement, the following three 
investment criteria are adopted by most agencies in the DC-Baltimore region: 
improving safety, mitigating congestion, and supporting economic development. The 
actual performance measures corresponding to these investment criteria, however, 
differ from agency to agency. Other investment criteria mentioned include 
environmental preservation, project cost, cost sharing, community improvement, 
accessibility, intermodal connections, and freight mobility. In the existing investment 
process, project cost estimates influence the planning process at a very late budget-
allocation stage after projects are already prioritized. Environmental considerations 
only impact the decision-making process as conformity constraints, which highlight 
the federal role in promoting environmental stewardship.     
 
3.6 Examples of Investment Processes in Other States 
 
After reviewing several studies on planning processes of transportation 
agencies at different levels of government throughout the United States, it was found 
out that in some states investment decisions are made in a similar way as our paper 




can be recommended for realization in the Washington DC – Baltimore region or at 
least transportation planners can think of when dealing with budget constraints or 
project prioritization issues.  
 
3.6.1 Florida Practices in Transportation Planning and Investment 
Florida Department of Transportation (FDT) issued an investment policy 
focused on the Strategic Intermodal System (SIS) which focuses on facilities of 
commercial service airports, spaceport, deepwater seaports, freight rail terminals, 
passenger rail and intercity bus terminals, rail corridors, waterways and highways 
(Kramer, Bond 2008). This new investment policy requires that seventy‐five percent 
of all new state capacity funding is spent on SIS and SIS‐related transportation 
facilities. This investment policy restricts the availability of funds for capacity and 
non‐capacity highway projects not on the SIS. In order to qualify for funding under 
SIS program, Florida MPOs consider three methods for project prioritization:  
• Weighting: SIS related facilities are assigned a very high score that places 
them above all other projects; 
• Inclusion: deficiencies of SIS facilities are ranked on the same scale as other 
projects; and  
• Separation: SIS facilities with expected deficiencies are matched to expected 
SIS funds and displayed in a separate funding table.  
This SIS policy initiative shows clearly what priority the FDOT values most 




local level in the planning process when local governments want to promote projects 
to meet their own needs.  
In terms of funding, MPOs rely on federal and transit planning funds from 
state and local sources. Typically funds available to MPOs are provided as 
reimbursements.  It means that MPOs spend money first and then request for 
reimbursement. Therefore, MPOs require local sources of funds to pay for expenses 
before requesting and receiving reimbursement from the state or federal government. 
The sources of local funds vary for each MPO. For example, an MPO can collect 
money through local sales taxes, additional gas taxes, bond sales and loans, or collect 
money per capita ($0.25 per capita in First Coast MPO) from each of the member 
counties on the basis of population estimates (Kramer, Bond 2008).  
Florida MPOs have developed a system of institutionalized interagency 
coordination: MPOs are coordinating with their neighbors, members, and peers to 
help guide the transportation planning process. Moreover, Florida MPOs are finding 
these cross‐agency relationships valuable (Kramer and Hopes 2007). A good example 
of interagency coordination is when MPOs have joined multi‐MPO coordinating 
bodies in the state. The multi‐MPO agencies take responsibility of jointly approving a 
list of important regional facilities, and each constituent MPO places a high emphasis 
on those facilities in the modeling and project selection components of its individual 
LRTP. MPOs are also participating collaborative efforts with their neighboring 
MPOs. This kind of multi-MPO coordination would be of great benefit to the 
Washington DC-Baltimore Region where coordination is mostly limited to Priority 




3.6.2 Kansas City Practices in Planning and Investment 
For the purposes of this study it was interesting to look at the area in the US 
that has city or district where two or more states participate in the transportation 
planning and decision-making process. This area is Kansas City, which is located in 
two states and transportation planning is supervised by the Mid-America Regional 
Council (MARC) that functions like an MPO. MARC contains a group called the 
Total Transportation Policy Committee (TTPC), which advises the MARC Board on 
transportation issues. In spite of the role of MARC, much of the decision-making 
happens at individual states’ priority committees of Missouri and Kansas.  An 
interesting thing here is that the scoring process for ranking projects is not the same 
for the two state subcommittees. The positive aspect of this is that political influences 
are not as prevalent and projects are chosen on the consensus basis between DOTs 
and MARC. However, MARC does not just approve projects proposed by DOTs, but 
puts constraints on budget allocation to different project categories (Final Report 
2001). For example, MARC can request from DOTs that their priority lists of projects 
contained 40% of capacity improvement projects (new roads, widening roads), 40% 
of rehabilitation and renovation and 20% of transportation system management 
projects. These budget allocation constraints can be different for two DOTs. For 
instance, in can be requested by MARC that one DOT would have 40% of their 
priority projects be capital facilities, and the other would have 45% of projects on the 
list as capital projects. This means that political process is prevalent to some degree in 
relationship between MARC and DOTs, but not as much between DOTs, who 




The Missouri and Kansas Departments of Transportation are very different 
from each other. Kansas DOT (KDOT) has a limit on the number of road miles they 
can control, so the focus of KDOT is primarily on freeways and other major intercity 
connectors. KDOT has all of its major functions in the central office, with the 
Districts having a more limited role.  
In Kansas, local governments submit projects to both MARC and KDOT, and 
at the same time KDOT submits pretty much the same projects to MARC. For KDOT 
an objective, data-driven computer application called the “priority formula” is used 
for selection of highway projects (Final Report 2001). Using data about the 
conditions of the state’s highway system, the “priority formula” identifies those 
highway sections most in need of improvement due to deficiencies in pavement 
conditions or problems related to traffic volume or safety concerns. The highest 
priority projects are chosen based on mathematical formulation and within the limits 
of available funds. This process of projects selection is performed once every 10 
years which makes it problematic to add new emerging projects when they are 
needed. Also, the KDOT formula evaluates road sections based on engineering 
deficiencies only, and doesn’t evaluate project impacts on communities.  
The Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) operates roads with a 
much broader range of functional classifications and is much more decentralized than 
Kansas, with planning, public involvement, and other functions. MARC receives 
applications for projects, while MoDOT processes agreements and approves projects. 
In Missouri it is not even necessary for a project to be on a long-range plan to qualify 




Missouri’s LRTP. MoDOT districts and planning partners annually prioritize regional 
needs, therefore making it easier to add emerging projects to the priority list upon 
their need. Both regional and statewide needs are prioritized primarily on objective 
data. Using the results of the prioritization process as a starting point, MoDOT 
districts and planning partners divide needs into three categories: high, medium and 
low priority. Even though the priority needs can be constrained, it is not guaranteed 
that projects will be implemented. Each time needs are prioritized, existing needs are 
be re-evaluated.   
In relation to coordination between the MPO and local counties and 
governments there is very little funding that goes down from the MPO to local 
jurisdictions.  Projects that are purely locally funded and that have impacts across 
jurisdictions are generally evaluated for their impact on the entire system by the 
MPO. If the local government is willing to fund the project then the project will 
generally become part of the regional TIP.  Local project selections do not currently 
have a real planning procedure for determining priorities but the regional government 
has common policy level direction. 
 
3.6.3 Minnesota Transportation Investment Prioritization 
In Minnesota every level of government has different priorities. For instance, 
at the state level MnDOT is driven by its strategic plan which looks primarily at 3 
priorities: preserve, manage, and expand (Montes de Oca, Levinson 2006). When it 
comes to large capacity expansion projects MnDOT examines the previous plans 




reconstructed or added capacity to a roadway section in the last 10 years or is in its 
current STIP, that roadway is not going to be considered for funding within the next 
30 years.  
The DOT identifies the needs, based on performance measures and targets, for 
a twenty to twenty-five year horizon with both a financially constrained and 
unconstrained plans. By setting aside some funds, Mn/DOT attempts to ensure that 
projects related to satisfying safety needs get funded. Safety issues more often lead to 
expansion than to management investments. State planners try to make investments 
that serve multiple aims. System plans have set aside specific percentages of dollars 
available every time; these percentages are 50 to 60 percent for preservation, about 20 
to 25 percent for management and 30 to 15 percent for expansion.  
For local projects, participating agencies submit applications for funding 
which are then reviewed by MnDOT. These projects are separated by categories: 
preservation, management, improvement and expansion, which are in MnDOT’s 
priority order. However, not all preservation projects get selected before management 
projects. Within each category there is ranking system. In order for a project to score 
better among other projects, the local agency seeking federal funding would adopt the 
Metropolitan Council criteria.  
At the county level the good example of investment planning is the Ramsey 
County in Minnesota where political processes in the planning process are absent 
(Montes de Oca, Levinson 2006). In this county Public Works Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) ranks all transportation projects. The TAC is comprised of city 




population within the county. The TAC and the County’s Public Works Department 
use a list of rating factors to determine a rating/prioritizing score for projects. Rating 
factors are well described which makes the project selection process easy to follow. 
Politicians are informed on how the project selection process works and all selection 
criteria are well documented. In turn, counties in DC-Baltimore region currently are 
just developing uniform ranking systems and it is hoped to see greater advancements 
in this area of policy-free prioritization in the near future.  
 
3.6.4 Ohio Small MPO Investment Processes 
In Ohio the number of MPOs and their different population ranges (less than 
and more than 200,000 people) pose a challenge for transportation funding 
distribution in the State. According to the Intermodal Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Act (ISTEA) the distribution formula for the newly designated Surface 
Transportation Program (STP) funds is allocated to MPOs with populations 
exceeding 200,000. However, as there are several MPOs in Ohio with the population 
less than 200,000 the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) has decided to 
allocate STP funds to these smaller MPOs as well on per capita basis. ODOT has 
recognized that the smaller MPOs have unique problems which demand creative and 
flexible funding scenarios (Rushley 2009). Several alternatives have been employed 
between the State and the MPOs as transportation partners to bring local project 
constructions to reality.  
In Ohio the ability to fund projects varies with the size of MPOs. Because of 




how they make use of their available funds. For example, an MPO can borrow funds 
from Ohio’s State Infrastructure Bank (SIB). Ohio’s SIB was initialized by the U. S. 
DOT as the nation’s first pilot SIB. Using second generation funds from the SIB, the 
MPO can borrow the necessary funds through bonds issued by the SIB. This option 
includes initializing costs and interest payments which raise the overall cost of the 
funds. In this case, a project requesting SIB funds should justify additional interest 
costs. Another ways of funding projects is when small MPOs can request a loan from 
the ODOT or any larger MPO in any given year and then repay using next annual 
allocation funds.  In the situation, when a small MPO does not have a priority project 
to implement, it can loan to another MPO and, in the next year, can accumulate 
funding for two allocation periods through return.  
These examples of how small MPOs in Ohio have developed solutions to 
funding larger projects within the fiscal constraints of annual allocations can be 




Based on a series of literature review and agency interviews, this chapter 
examines the complexity of the multimodal and multi-jurisdictional transportation 
investment process in the Washington DC-Baltimore region. Representative highway 
and transit agencies at the local, metropolitan, regional, and state levels are 
interviewed, and their existing investment processes summarized in this research 




a region make transportation investment decisions based on their own objectives and 
interactions with other agencies. The value of this type of research is two-fold. First, 
if conducted in several regions, it would allow comparison of alternative 
transportation planning and investment processes, and lead to improved processes. 
Second, understanding the existing investment process is necessary for modeling 
long-term transportation system changes, and for answering important planning 
questions (e.g. how will the transportation system evolve under current or alternative 
investment processes).    
The main conclusion that emerges from this empirical analysis and indicates 
areas in which improvements could take place (by looking at examples of other states 
and demonstrated modeling concept) is that colaboration between different levels of 
government is a key to creating a comprehensive regional land use and transportation 
plan that would meet needs throughout the Region, and not only focus on places that 
are more attractive from economic or political perspective, but create an environment 
for better resource allocations. Establishing innovative rules of engagement for 
planning and investment, defining new roles in the county and MPO decision-making 
process, recognizing that every agency in the Region is important, managing or 
reducing political procedures while maintaining the integrity of the State investment 
process – are the ways when decision-making process can become more or less 
unbiased. One of the ways of improved planning is, for example, through giving more 
power to MPOs and/or counties by allocating funding directly to them so that money 




schema may be appropriate in these conditions, but additional research is needed to 




Chapter 4: Modeling Agent-Based Transportation Network 
Growth 
 
This chapter provides a background on agent-based network growth model 
that integrates transportation demand with public and private sector investment 
processes. In particular, it describes the background components of the models, such 
as demand and supply modules, cost and performance measures necessary for 
modeling investment prioritization processes of public and private sectors before 
introducing game theoretical approach.  Agent modules of public and private 
investment processes and their interactions are just briefly mentioned in this chapter, 
and described in greater details in Chapters 5 and 6. The methodology for demand 
module considers user choices with a traditional four-step demand model and 
econometric cost structures, and for supply module – agent-based approach for 
modeling pricing and capacity choices by public and private roads.  
 
4.1 Dynamics of Transportation Network Growth 
 
As was acknowledged earlier, the primary challenge in understanding the 
various ramifications of roadway privatization is to model the interdependencies 
among travel demand, roadway costs, roadway capacity supply, pricing, and private 
entity market entry decisions in a dynamic mixed-ownership network with both 
public- and private-sector decision-makers to predict network growth patterns in the 




agencies collect transportation revenues in the form of fuel taxes. However, if roads 
were autonomous, it would be beneficial to maximize transportation profits through 
collection of road tolls. On the other hand, if revenues were collected by individual 
links, they might not be pooled together for investment purposes depending on the 
underlying institutional structure of the network. Generally, longer, faster, and high-
demand (traffic flow) links are able to generate more revenues.   
Specific revenue and cost structures in a transportation network provide inputs 
for supply decisions. The rate and extent of these decisions is constrained by the cost 
of those improvements (maintenance and construction) and limited budgets 
(revenues). From a market economy point of view, transportation investment 
decisions induce supply (capacity) increases - as population grows and preferences 
shift, leading to higher demand. If a link is expanded, travel increases on that link 
both due to re-routing and rescheduling and due to induced or latent demand (Noland 
1998, Strathman et al. 2000, Fulton et al. 2000, Parthasarathi et al. 2002). As travel 
costs for commuters are lowered, the number of trips and their lengths increase. The 
expanded link with increased travel demand can generate even more revenue which 
may later result in further expansion on that link. Improving one link can also cause 
complementary (upstream and downstream) links to have greater demand. This again 
highlights the importance of considering the full ramification of network expansion 
on future infrastructure decisions. This type of network effects suggests the analysis 
has to be iterative. Previous changes of the network, economy, demography, and even 




Accordingly, when a new set of supply decisions is made, it generates new network 
changes.   
In this research, the integrated agent-based growth model is developed that 
brings together all the relevant components, such as travel demand module, transport 
supply module, public and private road suppliers, regulation policies, and their 
interactions to simulate road expansion and resulting network changes. If we look at 
transportation network growth process through the evolutionary perspective, this 
model’s work-flow can be presented in the following way (see Figure 4-1): the travel 
demand module predicts link-level flows based on the network, socio-economic and 
demographic information. Based on the demand forecasting results, links calculate 
revenues and costs. The transportation supply module then operates and activates 
public sector decision and private sector decision modules by providing information 
on available revenues. Public sector module generates information on how much 
funding would go to maintenance and construction needs based on associated costs, 
and then allocates money based on selected performance measures (the procedure for 
public sector funding allocation is described in detail in Chapter 5). In the private 
sector module it is decided whether it would be profitable to enter the market and 
fund maintenance and construction of existing and new links in the system. This 
decision is highly dependent on the regulation policies in place at any particular 
moment through public-private agreement and how much profit the private sector 
would be able to generate (the procedure for private sector funding allocation and 
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After the decisions on capacity expansion and investments are made, all this 
information from public and private sectors is passed back to the transport supply 
module, after which actual transportation investments take place. Also, the 
transportation supply decisions cause network growth changes, which result in new 
travel demand patterns, produce new estimate for travel cost, new socio-economic 
information, new demand for infrastructure, and in turn affect future network growth. 
It is assumed that all decisions are annual decisions and that in each year the 
transportation system achieves a short-run equilibrium wherein travel demand, 
transportation costs, and investments are equilibrated. However, other updating 
intervals can also be used. But yearly supply changes correspond to budgets which 
are typically decided every fiscal year.   
A more detailed description of individual model components is presented in 
the subsequent paragraphs.  
 
4.2 Travel Demand Module 
 
A traditional four-step forecasting model is used to predict travel demand at 
the link level, taking exogenous land use, socio-economic variables, and the existing 
network as inputs. A zone-based regression structure is used for trip generation. Such 
characteristics, as link length, link capacity, free flow speeds, population and 
employment density, are used as initial inputs for travel demand model. The origin-
destination (OD) cost table obtained from the previous year traffic assignment is used 




(Haynes and Fotheringham 1984, Hutchinson 1974). The computation of the new OD 
demand table takes into account the historical impacts of past travel behavior. 
In contrast to a traditional equilibrium models, the evolutionary demand 
updating procedure does not require supply and demand to be solved simultaneously. 
On the contrary, the new OD demand is updated by a process similar to the method of 
successive averages (MSA) (Sheffi 1985, Smock 1962) in traditional traffic 
assignment procedures. The weights in equation (4.1) are specified in such a way that 
OD demand tables in all preceding years are weighted equally toward the current year 
(i) OD demand: 
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rs  - demand from origin zone r to destination zone s in year i; 
Or - number of trips produced from zone r; 
Ds - number of trips destined for zone s; 
mr, ns - coefficients in the gravity model; 
t
i
rs - generalized travel cost of traveling from zone r to s; 







γ - coefficient in the impedance function. 
 
The resulting OD table is loaded onto the current year transportation network 




developed by Bar-Gera and Boyce (2002). In this case, generalized link cost function 
comprises two parts, a BPR travel time component and a vehicle toll. 
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a - generalized travel cost on link a in year i; 
λ - value of travel time constant (dollar/hr); 
v
i
a - free-flow speed of link a (km/hr) in year i; 
F
i
a - capacity of link a in year i (veh/hr); 
la - the length of link a (constant) (km); 
f
i
a - average hourly flow on link a in year i (veh/hr); 
θ1 , θ2 - coefficients of the BPR travel time function; 
τ
i
a - link toll per vehicle. 
 
The OBA algorithm derives link flows at user equilibrium and generates a 
new OD cost table which will be used for trip distribution in the next year.  
 
4.3 Initial Revenue and Travel Costs 
Revenue is collected at the link level through vehicle tolls (whether gas tax 
equivalent for public sector, or private sector roadway toll). The annual revenue is 




on the length of the link and the level of service. Therefore, the following revenue 
equation is proposed:  
(  ' · * ·   #                                                                                                  (4.3) 
'  +
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Where: 
(  – revenue of link a in year i (dollar), 
* – coefficient to scale average hourly flow to annual flow, 
+
 – scale coefficient related to the toll level (dollar· /0-1  / 3-45-6#, 
+4, +6 – coefficients indicating economies or diseconomies of scale. 
 
As the free-flow speed of a link increases, travelers are able to save travel 
time and hence willing to pay a higher toll. However, speed improvements have 
decreasing returns. For instance, if speed triples from 8 to 24 km/hr, time spent 
traveling 1 km drops 5 minutes from 7.5 min to 2.5 min. If speed increases 16 km/hr 
from 88 km/hr to 104 km/hr, the time drops from 41 seconds to 35 seconds – merely 
6 seconds – which hardly seems worth considering. Therefore, coefficient ρ3 should 
be between 0 and 1.   
In the case of public sector, where revenues are collected through fuel taxes, 
therefore represent centralized revenue collection mechanism, coefficients ρ2 and ρ3 





4.4 Road Construction and Maintenance Costs 
 
Road construction and maintenance costs are modeled separately. The 
specification of the construction cost function is based on recent empirical findings in 
Levinson and Karamalaputi (2003), who estimated a Cobb-Douglas cost function 
based on more than 100 recent highway construction projects. Their findings suggest 
that the cost structure exhibits increasing returns to scale with respect to lane miles of 
construction, and it is more expansive to construct higher level roads (often with 
higher level of existing capacity). The following specification captures these effects: 
 
31 2 1( ) ( ) ( )t t t ta a a a aK l F F F
σσ σφ += ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −                 (4.5) 
 
Where: 
l - kilometers of roadway construction, Ft+1 – Ft - additional capacity added, 
F
t - existing road capacity, 
ø - technology factor, 
t - the index of time. 
 
Few academic studies have empirically estimated the maintenance cost of 
individual facilities.    We assume that it depends on the length, and the capacity of 
the specific road. Furthermore, it is assumed that maintenance cost has constant 




capacity. The technology factor (µ) can be adjusted so that the total base year 
maintenance cost matches observed base year observed maintenance cost.  
1 2( ) ( )t ta a aM l F
θ θµ= ⋅                               (4.6)     
 
4.5 Public Sector Module 
 
Users of existing public roads pay fuel taxes, vehicle sales and registration 
taxes, and driver license fees, and even general taxes for travel. I convert all taxes and 
fees users pay on public roads to an equivalent distance-based toll at about 2.5 cents 
per kilometer based on the 2009 federal and state gas tax rates, and average vehicle 
fuel efficiency.   
The actual investment rule employed by the public-sector transportation 
agencies for prioritizing road construction projects typically involves multiple 
decision makers (e.g. state DOT, MPO, local governments) and multimodal 
objectives (e.g. congestion mitigation, safety, supporting economic development). 
Based on in-depth interviews and quantitative processes currently employed by state, 
metropolitan, and local government agencies in the Washington DC-Baltimore 
region, a rule-based investment model has been developed to simulate the current 
business-as-usual decision-making processes (see Chapter 5). These rules depend on 
the most valued by government agencies three performance measures, which are: 
safety, congestion and accessibility. Safety is determined through links accident rates. 
After comparing various accident prediction models used in the literature and 




links from the study done by Chen et al. (2003) are used in this research for safety 
evaluation in public investment process. Arterial links safety is ranked based on the 
following estimated Poisson model: 
Y = 4.61215 – 0.085300X1 + 0.327695X2 + 0.027944X3;                                       (4.7)                                                 
 
Where: 
Y- Accident rate in peak or off-peak hours; 
X1 - Annual average volume per hour during peak and off-peak periods; 
X2 - Median type (divided or not); 
X3 - Intersection density (defined as the ratio of number of intersections to Link 
length). 
 
Safety of freeway links is ranked based on the following estimated Poisson 
model Chen et al. (2003): 
 
Y = 5.81252 + 0.1140E-03X1 – 1.358E-02X2 + 0.142474X3 – 0.064002X4;            (4.8)                  
 
Where: 
Y - Accident rate during peak or off-peak hours, 
X1 - Volume per lane; 
X2 - Median width; 





X4 - Number of through lanes. 
 
Congestion of links is determined through volume to capacity ratio: 
Xi = Vi/Ci;                                                                                                                (4.9)                                
 
Where: 
Vi – volume on a link i, 
Ci – capacity on a link i. 
 
Accessibility is usually referenced as the measure by which travel costs are 
determined (e.g. the impedance function from gravity models applied to the travel 
time between two zones) and, also a spatial element reflecting the distribution of the 
activities in a region. In this model two standard measures of job and residential 
accessibility are adopted to convert travel time changes into accessibility shifts. 
Accessibility changes due to changing travel costs between origins and destinations, 
jobs and houses located in a specific zone may become more (or less) accessible 
relative to other zones in the region, which leads to increased (or decreased) level of 
future jobs and houses in that zone. The models for residential and employment 
distributions are adopted from Zhang et al. (2009) and as follows: 
 
The population of the zone i after accessibility changes: 
 









 - Initial population of the zone i, 








 – New accessibility to work of zone i. 
 
Employment in the zone i after accessibility changes: 
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Where: 












 – New accessibility to house of zone i. 
 
In the public investment model population and employment growth are 
evaluated for each zone, and then zones are scaled and ranked based on their future 
estimated populations and employments. The links connected to zones with highest 
growth are prioritized for funding.  
Whenever public transportation agencies perform investment procedures, first 
they make sure that all maintenance needs of the network are met. Only after that, 




three performance measures, which in their own turn depend on the performance of 
each individual link. Links performance evaluation summary is passed to the multi-
agent transport supply module, which activates and causes transportation network to 
grow and expand in places most in need for congestion, safety and accessibility 
improvements. A link with the highest needs is funded first, then next “in line” link is 
funded, and so on. The investment process continues till the point when the public 
budget is exhausted. In case, if there is still money left after previous links’ 
investments, but that amount is not sufficient to fund the next link “in line”, then that 
link is dismissed by its successor link and the cost of improvement for successor link 
is compared against available funding. If the cost is matched, then the link is 
financed, otherwise – a new link down the scale is selected.  
 
4.6 Private Sector Module 
 
In the agent-based network growth model private sector derives the price and 
capacity choices of private roads by examining the information available to private 
roads and allowing private roads to adjust their decisions over time as more 
information becomes available. Cooperation between private roads is assumed away, 
and each private road is only interested in its own profit.  Private roads maximize 
short-term profits by setting the appropriate tolls given the current capacity levels. 
The profit-maximizing toll depends on travelers’ demand elasticities with respect to 
tolls, which depend on all substitutional and complementary effects in the network. 




future years on complex networks is hard due to intrinsic demand uncertainties, 
network complexity, and data availability for forecasting. Under these circumstances, 
private roads can better achieve their profit objectives by learning demand responses 
adaptively as they accumulate information on historical tolls, the resulting traffic 
flows, and profit levels. It is therefore assumed in the model that private roads employ 
price (toll) and quantity (flow) information in the previous time periods to estimate 
the underlying demand curves.  
 
4.6.1 Market Entry 
Private investment companies interested in transportation financing will base 
their market entry decisions on the estimated long-run returns of investment of 
individual private road projects. Their pricing and investment decisions are modeled 
using a normative approach. The total profit (π) a private investor can expect from a 
candidate private road project a build with capacity F and toll rate τ is: 
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Where: 
T - expected life span of the project,  
t - index of year,  
f - traffic volume on the road,  
λ - discount factor so that the profit is expressed as the present value, 




a – road project index. 
 
The first term on the right hand side is the total revenue, the second term 
construction cost according to equation (4.5), and the third term maintenance cost 
according to equation (4.6). It is assumed that T = 30 years, and the discount rate is 
6% which defines discount factors in all years. The life span of a private toll road 
should be the minimum of the structural life and the concession period. For instance, 
the concession period is 30 years for Route-3 in Massachusetts, 35 years for SR-125 
in California, 42.5 years for the Dulles Greenway in Washington, DC, and 99 years 
for Route-895 in Virginia (FHWA 2006).   
In the model, the private sector will solve this optimization problem each year 
for each candidate or existing toll road projects, and determine the profit-maximizing 
toll and capacity investment under all applicable regulatory constraints. The 
maximum profit can be obtained at the optimal private road capacity (Fa
0), and 
optimal tolls (τa
t) in all future years within the life span of the project, subject to: (1) 
the future travel demand; and (2) the capacity and price choices of the parallel public 
roads which are specified through the regulatory policies.  
Once the expected profits and immediate investment requirements (the 
construction costs) are determined, the rates of investment return on all candidate 
private toll road projects can be computed. The private investment companies 
(modeled as a collective whole) will construct a private toll road if the investment 





4.6.2 Capacity Choice 
It is assumed that once a market entry decision is made, a private toll road will 
be constructed and becomes operational in the next year (i.e. one-year design-build 
time). As travel demand grows and the private toll roads learn more information 
about the “actual” (in the model) demand elasticities, they may be expanded by the 
investor if capacity expansion is profitable and regulatory policy allows doing so. If 
the new capacity is higher than the current capacity, and if the return rate of the 
additional capacity investment is higher than the base rate (6%), the particular private 
toll road will be expanded to the new capacity. However, both the initial construction 
and subsequent expansion decisions are irreversible even if a private road is losing 
money. Although new capacity choices can be made at any time, it is assumed that 
they are considered once a year by the private investor because the public sector at 
most updates its transportation investment plan once a year.  
After private company has decided to invest into the public network, the 
information on candidate links for privatization is passed to the multi-agent transport 
supply module, and network changes take place, such as some links in the public 
network become privatized and expanded.  However, private investor’s tolling and 
capacity decisions are both subject to regulatory policies when privatizing public 
roadways. Three most-widely adopted regulatory schemes on private toll roads in the 
U.S. are considered in this research (and described in greater detail in Chapter 6): 






4.6.3 Pricing Strategy 
When setting tolls, private roads under decentralized ownership take road 
capacity as given and seek to maximize their short-run profits in an imperfectly 
competitive market. In a market economy consisting of many private roads, any 
individual private investor does not possess perfect knowledge about other investors’ 
road pricing and capacity expansion decisions, which causes uncertainty about the 
demand curves on individual private roads. There private pricing behavior is modeled 
as the outcome of an adaptive learning process. In this approach, a private link in the 
network copes with uncertainty and imperfect information by learning demand 
patterns from historical road usage data under road tolls set in the past. The collective 
influence of the decisions by other private roads is represented by the shape of the 
link-specific demand curve (i.e. link flow versus generalized link travel cost). The 
process through which the private link adjusts its toll to maximize profit is depicted in 
Figure 4.2. Due to traffic growth and/or new pricing/investment decisions by other 
links, the demand curve on the private link shifts over time. Therefore in each time 
period, the private link estimates a new demand curve based on its own link flows and 
tolls in the previous time periods (represented by crosses in the graph) with linear 
line-fitting techniques. The previous tolls fall into a range [Plow, PHigh]. The estimated 
demand curve can be extrapolated beyond this toll range (the dashed portions on the 
demand curve). Based on this empirical demand curve learned from experience, a 
standard quadratic optimization procedure finds the theoretical profit-maximizing 
toll, P*, for the next time period (Zhang and Levinson 2007). If P*∈ [Plow, PHigh] 




new price territory (Case B), the link will take caution and adjust its toll toward P*B 
only by a conservative small step j to PLow(1 – j), where j is a parameter. Similarly, if 
P*B is higher than PHigh (not shown in Figure 4-2), the new toll would be PHigh(1 + j). 
This pricing rule assists private roads to maximize profit and keep the price changes 
smooth. The impact of toll regulations can also be easily incorporated when a price-
ceiling regulation is introduced. However, the heuristic nature of this adaptive pricing 
rule may introduce estimation biases when demand curves shift abruptly or 
consistently in the same direction for a long period of time.  
 






4.7 Welfare Measures 
 
Since in the agent-based network growth model I consider two types of road 
owners, public and private, it is essential to measure the true benefits associated with 
the introduction of private sector into the publicly owned network, especially from 
the consumer point of view. Therefore, it is important to study the welfare impacts of 
road privatization arrangements. In the model it is assumed that private road 
authorities maximize profits, and public road authorities maximize social welfare 
without budget constraint or discounting. In this case the general welfare function for 
a network growth process over a period of time would take the following form: 
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Where b, q, and a are indices OD pairs, users of an OD pair, and roads 
respectively, and delta indicates capacity changes. The first term is users’ willingness 
to pay. The second term is user cost including toll. The third term is total revenue for 
the facility provider, and the last term is facility provision cost. A private road 
company simply maximizes total profits that are produced from all roads it owns: 
 





If public sector makes socially-optimal investments (which is not the case in 
the real world), it would perform system-wide benefit cost analysis that considers all 
quantifiable benefits and costs. With socially-optimal investment, the public sector 
first is supposed to collect revenue from fuel taxes and other public-sector revenue 
streams, use the revenue to cover roadway maintenance and operations costs, and 
finally direct the remaining revenue to expand the roads with the highest benefit cost 
ratios until either the revenue is exhausted or all remaining projects have benefit cost 
ratios less than one. In the later case, the residual revenue is saved for future 
investment.   
The measure of benefits consumers experience with public and private, and 
public-private ownership regimes is presented in the following way:  
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Where: 
NQT  – consumer’s surplus, 
y - index of simulation periods, 
v - index of OD pairs, 
V - total number of OD pairs in the network, 
WT 	 generalized cost paid by users of OD pair v, 




j - Index of users in OD pair v, 
t - travel time, 
τ – toll, 
VOTj - value of time of user j. 
 
This measure of consumers’ surplus is sensitive to travel time savings that 
take place after links capacity expansion by public and private sectors, and to toll 
setting changes, which are a subject to public sector’s regulation policies and private 




So far, a complete cycle of the agent-based network growth process has been 
presented. This cycle repeats itself year after year. Simulation of these cycles can 
reveal various emergent properties of transportation network growth as well system 
wide implications of utilizing private sector financing into publicly owned 
infrastructure.   
This research originates from the need to consider transportation demand and 
supply jointly in a coherent theoretical and modeling framework. Understanding the 
true relationships between demand and supply in single or mixed ownership 
environment in transportation systems is the crucial task in theoretical development 




process by which the expansion of roads is driven by interdependent decisions of 
transportation authorities and private firms. The agent-based simulation method is an 
appealing modeling approach for analyzing the simultaneous and interactive changes 
of demand and supply changes over time. This modeling approach is very suitable 
when evaluating transportation management decisions and policies. The detailed 
description of public and private supply modules and simulation experiments of the 








Chapter 5: Public Sector Network Growth Model of 




In this chapter a quantitative model with agent-based techniques is developed, 
which forecasts future transportation networks and their performance under both 
existing and alternative transportation planning processes. The existing planning 
process is modeled based on empirical analysis of in-depth interviews with state, 
metropolitan, and local transportation agencies in the Washington DC-Baltimore 
Region described in Chapter 3. In order to convert qualitative information of 
decision-making to quantitative structured model, the agent-based approach is 
adopted to closely replicate investment procedures of the public transportation 
agencies. Revenue generation, project selection process, policy and technical 
prioritization as well as agents’ interaction processes are modeled after current 
investment practices of the transportation agencies in DC-Baltimore Metropolitan 
Area. Agents in the model are divided into two groups to represent state and local 
governments. While transit agencies were interviewed for the empirical analysis, this 
agent-based model considers only highway investments. The model’s effectiveness is 
also compared with that under alternative planning processes characterized by 




state, metropolitan, and local agencies. The key agents of the Model and their rules 
are described below. 
 
5.2 Multimodal MDOT Agent 
 
The Maryland Department of Transportation (MDOT) is one of the State’s 
largest agencies “committed to delivering a balanced and sustainable multimodal 
transportation system” for Maryland’s residents and businesses (MDOT 2009). 
MDOT handles partnerships across modes and with partner agencies to support 
statewide plans. MDOT retains responsibility for decisions on capital investments as 
well as operating and planning activities that reach across all modes of transportation 
and is responsible for distributing the state’s transportation budget between the 
modes. At the same time the Transportation Secretary’s Office (TSO) establishes 
transportation policy in the State (MD TIP 2008). MDOT represents the MDOT 
Agent in our model. MDOT Agent tries to achieve the most efficient use of the 
existing transportation system: maintenance and preservation are prioritized over 
other needs to extend the useful life of facilities and equipment in existing budget 
shortfalls. MDOT has a unified pot of money - Transportation Trust Fund (TTF) - 
that provides flexibility to fund high-priority projects across the state regardless of 
transportation modes. Nowadays, system preservation accounts for 42% of MDOT 
Agent’s expenditures (MD TIP 2008). It means that only about 39% of the MDOT’s 
budget goes to capital programming (keeping in mind that about 19% of the budget 




In the future, system preservation may require even greater portion of the budget if 
new sources of funding are not being identified for both maintenance and capital 
expansion needs. However, U.S. Department of Transportation will be awarding 
grants under the Interim Transportation Investments Generating Economic Recovery 
(TIGER) Guidelines for the projects meeting certain criteria (2009). These grants will 
be helpful in achieving a better state of the transportation system in Maryland. To 
qualify for the TIGER grants the projects should demonstrate significant long-term 
benefits (state of good repair, livability, sustainability, safety) and lead to creating 
new jobs and economic development in the Region. These criteria help to assume that 
the percentage of budget allocated to Maryland’s system preservation and capital 
expansion activities will remain on about the same level as nowadays, as the TIGER 
program favors both types of expenditures. Also, this grant program will continue 
supporting the current transportation policy practices in Maryland, keeping safety, 
congestion mitigation and accessibility improvements as top priorities in project 
selection process. Of the 42% MDOT Agent allocates to system preservation where 
the Maryland SHA gets 14% and 52% goes to transit needs of Maryland Transit 
Administration (MTA) and WMATA (MDOT 2009).  
MDOT Agent’s capital expenditures which, as was mentioned earlier, account 
for 39% of total expenditures, are also distributed among different state modes, where 
the SHA receives the biggest chunk - about 52% (according to current transportation 
program), and 33% goes to meet WMATA and MTA needs. (See Figure 5-1 for 
schematic representation of MDOT’s budget allocations) Once funding is distributed 




improvement activities and projects begins. Each mode administration, in particular 
the SHA, MTA and WMATA, has their own investment processes based on the 




Figure 5-1: MDOT Agent Budget Allocation between Highway and Transit 
 
5.3 State and Local Agents in Charge of Highway Investments 
 
When the SHA, which represents State Agent in the model, receives funding 
from the MDOT for maintenance and preservation needs, it decides on its own how to 
use that money. The State Agent first ensures that the roads belonging to state system 
are properly maintained. Only after investing into structural deficiencies, State Agent 
can put money into capacity expansion activities. Usually State Agent relies on its 
Highway Needs Inventory that includes the list of all structural deficiencies in the 
system. As it is almost impossible to fund all of those deficiencies due to budget 
shortfalls, the projects from the Inventory are mostly selected based on 2 measures: 




here, that from the interview with the SHA staff it was found out that bridges usually 
require twice as much funding as pavements do. This leads to an assumption that two 
thirds of available operational funding is spent on bridges, and one third – on 
pavements. Road roughness quality is measured using the International Roughness 
Index (IRI). It is a measurement of the “bumpiness” of the road. Low values (0-94) 
indicate a very smooth riding quality, while higher values (above 220) indicate a 
rougher riding road. The range of IRI for each category of roads is based on limits set 
by the Federal Highway Administration. Assuming the State Agent inspects IRI on all 
state links, the first candidates for funding would be links with the highest IRI. The 
State Agent tries to maintain about 84% of pavements in the system in “acceptable” 
condition. As for bridges, the more time has passed since its last maintenance, the 
higher the possibility the bridge requires improvement works. Therefore, bridge 
projects from the Inventory are assumed to be selected for funding based on their 
maintenance schedule. At the same time, all the bridges (about 2500 bridges) in the 
system should be in safe conditions. It is also worth mentioning here that while 
pavement and bridge maintenance consumes the majority of State’s system 
preservation budget, there are 24 special smaller funding categories dedicated to 
specific needs including drainage, traffic signs, and community improvement. As we 
do not know the percentage of funding going to these “small” needs, we assume that 
money for these activities comes from State Agent’s own budget.  For capital projects 
State Agent is required to work in coordination with state counties and MPOs (they 
represent Local agents in the model). Local agents are responsible for generating their 




evaluation of the roads within their jurisdictional boundaries. Some of the roads in 
local jurisdictions may qualify for State agent’s funding, which is determined through 
the policy and technical prioritization process. 
 
Figure 5-2: State Agent (SHA) Maintenance Budget Allocation 
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Each local jurisdiction (e.g. counties and cities; referred to as Local Agents in 
the model) may propose a project for state funding for a variety of reasons, such as 
being very important for local needs as well as state development, but still it cannot 
be guaranteed to be sponsored due to the State agent’s policy considerations, limited 
financial resources and technical evaluation. In reality, some projects move forward 
when the SHA selects them as preferred alternatives in studies, in other cases - 
projects are delayed or dropped because funding is unavailable, because other “more 
important” projects emerge, or simply because there is controversy from policy point 
of view whether the State benefits from a particular project or not. Sometimes locally 
proposed transportation improvements are listed for years in local or state plans 
before any action is taken to get them funded. This is largely due to the lack of 
financial resources and the “black box” of political decisions that produce 
unpredictable decisions on funding.  
In the model the State Agent considers 2 factors when selecting capital 
projects for funding (whether they are state or local): policy factor and technical 
evaluation. For each factor a project gets a score. For policy factor a score can be as 
high as 60 points, and for technical evaluation – a maximum of 40 points. A score for 
policy factor depends on who is promoting a project: the State Agent or a Local 
Agent. If State Agent proposes a project, than that project always gets 60 points for 
policy factor. If a Local Agent – then a score will depend on how important a project 
is for local needs (policy score given by a Local Agent), its score obtained from State 
Agent technical evaluation and the amount of contribution a Local Agent is willing to 




The State agent’s technical evaluation is based on three performance 
measures, which are safety, congestion and accessibility improvements. A project can 
get up to 15 points for safety performance, 15 points – for congestion and 10 points – 
for the need of accessibility improvements in particular zone. Capital projects 
submitted by Local Agents and projects in the State agent inventory undergo the same 
technical evaluation.  
Whenever the SHA performs investment procedures based on the above 
described measures, which in their own turn depend on the performance of each 
individual link, the transportation network grows and expands in places where links 
score the highest for policy and technical factors. Policy factor has higher weight than 
technical evaluation (60 points versus 40 points), which explains why in some cases 
there no action is taken for technically “needed” projects. A link with the highest 
combined policy and technical score is funded first, then next “in line” link is funded, 
and so on. The investment process continues till the point when the budget is 
exhausted. In case, if there is still money left after previous links’ investments, but 
that amount is not sufficient to fund the next link “in line”, then that link is dismissed 
by its successor link and the cost of improvement for successor link is compared 
against available funding. If the cost is matched, then the link is financed, otherwise – 
a new link down the scale is selected. From interview observations, it can be stated 
that the performance measures of the Local Agents are the same with the State, but 
the point distributions are different as they are determined through the processes of 
Local Agents’ budget allocations. When selecting state links that might qualify for 




policy evaluation. And again, policy factor has higher weight than technical factor (60 
points versus 40 points). Local agent’s policy evaluation is also some kind of “black 
box” of decisions, which means that this process is very subjective. 
 
Figure 5-3: Summary of the State Agent (SHA) Investment Processes 
 
Projects from which a Local Agent benefits the most are given the highest 
scores, but it is difficult to predict which project a Local Agent will consider 
beneficial and which – not. However, each Local Agent can not submit unlimited 
number of projects with high scores and neglect projects with low policy scores. To 
remind, the final decision on funding is after the SHA, and Local Agent’s low policy 




projects. Therefore, to closely reflect reality, in our model we assume that every 
Local Agent submits 5 projects with policy score 60, 4 projects with policy score 40 
and 3 projects with policy score 20. When performing technical evaluation, a Local 
Agent considers the same three measures as the State agent does, but the point 
assignment is different. The total number of scores a particular project can get for 
overall performance is 40.  
Link scores obtained from Local agents’ technical evaluation are summed 
with the corresponding policy scores given by each Local Agent. After that Local 
agents submit a list of qualified links. To remind, each agent can submit 12 projects 
(5 projects with policy score 60, 4 – projects with policy score 40, and 3 – with score 
20). Combined with the technical score, these 12 projects will need to have the 
following number of scores: 
• 5 projects with scores greater than 80, where 60 points would come 
from policy factor, 
• 4 projects with scores 61 – 80, where 40 points would come from 
policy score, 
• 3 projects – with scores 41 – 60, where 20 points would be from Local 







Figure 5-4: Local Agent (Counties) Project Prioritization for State Agent 
Funding 
 
5.4 State-Local Agency Interactions in the Highway Transportation 
Planning Process 
 
Agent-based planning is when multiple agents coordinate their activities. It 
involves:1) agents’ planning for a common goal – the future state of the 
transportation network, 2) the State agent’s coordinating and compiling the plans of 
others into the general merged plan, and 3) a Local agent refining its own plan while 




The general idea of multi-agent planning is to combine a planning method for each 
agent with an auction for delegating investment priorities in the shared transportation 
system.   
In this research model the agents are making their investment plans 
independently of what the other agent is planning but they have to coordinate their 
efforts in creating one merged plan based on those independent plans as it is done in 
the real worls. The performance measures valued by each individual agent determine 
which links in the network qualify for funding and therefore are included into their 
plans.  
In the agent-based planning process the agents’ primarily characteristics are: 
1. Each agent does not have the accurate abilities to solve the whole problem, i.e. 
each agent cannot determine all the links in the system that requires 
investment. 
2. Data about links are not centralized, so they must be shared by all agents. 
3. Each agent has his own ranking system for determining candidates for 
investment. 
4. All agents in the system are designed to be self-interested and myopic. That is, 
in making a decision, such as selecting a particular link into a plan, the agents 
are only concerned with their own needs. Agents have no way to estimate 
other agent's needs but have an idea of what would benefit to the global 
welfare of the system. The main goal of the Local agent is to prioritize links 
based on performance measures, and the main goal of the State agent is to 




The links in the system are organized in a priority queue, sorted by the 
performance measures of Local agents, and then the links are sorted again by the 
State agent. In detail, the negotiation process between agents can be described as 
follows: 
1. First, each agent, whether State or Local, ensures that all the links in the 
system are properly maintained. Each agent uses its own budget for 
maintenance needs. 
2. After maintenance, each agent selects candidate projects for capital expansion. 
Each Local agent observes all the links under his supervision, ranks links 
based on performance measures as was described earlier and submits links to 
the State agent for further consideration. State Agent performs technical 
evaluation for his own links as well. 
3. Each Local agent submits 5 “high priority” projects, 4 – “medium priority”, 
and 3 – “low priority” projects for State’s evaluation. 
4. The State agent evaluates the condition of Local links again but based on his 
own performance measures. During this process, links can get higher scores 
than was assigned to them earlier, or can get much lower scores even if a link 
was originally claimed to be “high priority”. Therefore, some of a Local 
agent’s links get funded and some of them not. If a particular link is not 
funded, it is sent back to a Local agent. In this case, a Local agent funds this 
link if it was high priority and budget still allows after maintaining links 





It is important to note, that all the agents are subjectively rational when 
making decisions. And in many cases they make preferences based on their policy 
considerations, rather than technical assessment.   
 
Figure 5-5: The Complete Existing Highway Investment Decision-Making Process 
with State and Local Agents 
 
5.5 Benchmark Scenarios 
 
Although the proposed model structure can evaluate most investment 
scenarios in real world networks, this paper considers a hypothetical city with grid 




investment regime and alternative centralized state regime, where all roads are 
controlled by state government, and decentralized local regime, where each local 
jurisdiction controls investments into its own roads. The hypothetical city network 
consists of 10 by 10 grid road way links of 2-mile in length and an initial capacity of 
775.5 vehicles/hour on each link. In the city a uniform initial land use pattern is 
assumed, and each node has 100 residents and 100 jobs. Each network link is 
assigned to either the State Agent or one of the five Local Agents. Based on the 
existing planning process, the State Agent controls all major state highways, 
represented by two north-south corridors, two west-east corridors, and a beltway 
system in the stylized network. All other links are assigned to the five Local Agents 
with one local agent in the city center and each of the four other local agents 
occupying one of the four corner areas in this stylized network.   
When the agent-based simulation is executed, the travel demand model first 
predicts link-level flows. Based on the demand forecasts, revenues available to state 
and local agents are computed respectively based on the existing revenue policies (i.e. 
fuel tax, registration fees, and some general funds). After that the investment model, 
developed in Section 4, operates and forecasts investment decisions based on the 
current planning processes adopted by state and local agents. After each round of 
investment decisions, the network is updated with improved capacities for links 
selected for investment. Network performance measures are also computed for each 
investment cycle (one cycle per year), including total travel time, total distance 
traveled, average speed, total revenue collected, user benefits/consumer surplus, and 




experiments to observe the effects of current and alternative investment processes on 
future network performance.  Three transportation planning and investment processes 
are considered:  
1. Base Case: This scenario represents the existing transportation planning and 
investment process in the DC-Baltimore Area;  
2. State Control Case: The State agent has centralized control over all links in 
the system and makes decisions for the entire budgeting and investment 
process. And 
3. Local Control Case: State agent has no influence in the transportation 
planning process at all. Each of the five local Agent monitors and budgets the 




Figure 5-6a illustrates the transportation network changes and capacity 
increases over a 50-year period when transportation investment decisions are made 
according to the current planning process in the DC-Baltimore region wherein state 
and local agencies share power and engage in negotiations. This planning process has 
resulted in a hierarchical network with two major north-south freeways, two major 
west-east freeways, and a beltway system also with higher capacities. This network 
topology is consistent with that in many U.S. urban areas.   
Figure 5-6b presents the transportation network changes under complete State 




considerations such as safety, congestion and accessibility. Overall, the future 
network under State Control is similar to that under the current planning process, 
which is consistent with our empirical observations that state DOT and State 
Highway Administration are the dominate decision makers in the current planning 
process and controls most of the resources. Further examination reveals that under 
complete State Control, there are fewer investment projects on the periphery of the 
network compared to the existing planning process. Clearly, state agent invests in 
peripheral roads under the existing planning process only because these projects are 
high-priority projects for the individual local agents.  
Figure 5-6c plots the transportation network changes under decentralized 
Local Control. Recall that in this case the state agent has no power at all and each 
local agent controls the resource from its own jurisdiction and makes investment 
decisions solely based on the interests of its own jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, the 
resulting future network is much less hierarchical and capacities are much more 
evenly distributed in all areas of the region.   
Local agents apparently have no incentives to building major high-capacity 
freeways that primarily serve through traffic. Under this type of decentralized local 
control, the future network most likely consists of many major arterial roads with 
moderately high capacity. It should be pointed out that this network topology under 
Local Control has a lot more redundancy (i.e. good alternative routes) than that under 
the current planning process or under State Control, and therefore should be more 







a: Base Case Scenario 
 
b: State Control Scenario 
 
c: Local Control Scenario 
 




Numerical results summarizing the performance the future networks are 
provided in Table 5-1. Compared to the two alternative planning processes, the 
current transportation planning process will produce a future network that is inferior 
by all performance measures: higher total vehicle hours traveled, lower vehicle 
kilometers traveled, lower average speed, lower total revenue, lower user benefits, 
and lower net social benefits. These finding based on the stylized grid network 
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Table 5-1: Future Network Performance under Alternative Transportation Planning 
Processes 
 
It is to our surprise that the Local Control scenario is shown to be the most 




kilometers traveled, higher average speed, higher total revenue, higher user benefits 
and net social benefits. This implies that the current top-down investment process is 
less efficient, while more locally distributed funding allocation and the possibility of 
investments into the projects considered mostly by local jurisdictions delivers 
superior overall network performance results. Also, the strategy by state agencies that 
focuses on expanding the capacity of the most congested bottlenecks may not be a 
very good long-term policy. It is probably more effective to address the congestion 
problem on a particular road by expanding the capacity of its parallel roads, which in 
the long run produces a transportation network with a more balanced capacity 
distribution, not a very hierarchical one.  
 
5.7 Sensitivity Analysis with Regard to Public Revenues 
 
A sensitivity analysis comparing decreases/increases in revenue sources of 
public sector and lane kilometers changes are shown in Figure 5-7. The graphical 
representation is provided. All other variables were held constant at their assumed 
levels during the analysis. The decrease/increase in revenue was varied for each case 
scenario (“business-as-usual network ownership”, state control case scenario and 
local control scenario). The resulting changes in lane kilometers of public roads are 
presented after 50 year period simulation.  
In “Base Case” scenario we can see some changes in increase/decrease of 
capacity with regard to changes in revenue streams; especially we can see a huge 




5%. It is a good indicator that currently highway capacity is highly under-invested. In 
“State Control” scenario we do not see as much new lane kilometers built as in the 
“Base Case”, due to possible inefficient resources allocation. Since in this case we 
have only one decision-maker – the State, there is no cooperation/coordination 
present, therefore the State may choose to spend majority of its funds for maintenance 




Figure 5-7: Sensitivity Analysis with Regard to Public Revenues 
 
 “Local Control” scenario results show that even small changes in revenues 
can increase lane kilometers of public roads. It can be explained by the fact, that 
when funding is allocated directly to local jurisdictions, State does not participate in 
money allocation. And local jurisdictions are interested in improving their road 





















































conditions due to competition in economic development.  When dealing with 
decreased amount of revenue, all the scenarios respond with decrease in lane 




This chapter demonstrates the feasibility of developing quantitative models 
that can forecast future networks under current and alternative transportation planning 
processes. The current transportation planning process is modeled based on empirical 
information collected from interviews with key transportation agencies and planning 
documents published by these agencies. The investment decision-makings rules of 
and interaction/negotiations among state and local transportation authorities are 
explicitly considered in the proposed agent-based model. Results on a test network 
show the current transportation planning process can be improved in several different 
ways. Either a more centralized or more decentralized planning process can improve 
investment decision-making and enhance the performance of future transportation 
networks.   
It would be naïve to believe a major reform of the current transportation 
planning process will happen anytime soon. After all, it is a process driven by 
political considerations, air quality concerns, economic development, safety, and 
engineering efficiency.  While it is certainly feasible to employ the proposed model to 
evaluate alternative planning processes out of intellectual interests, the most likely 




a particular group of investment projects on future network performance. Another 
application is to forecast future networks for long-range transportation planning and 
policy scenario analysis. Currently, there is not a general method for generating future 
transportation networks 30 or 50 years from now, though this kind of planning 
horizon is often required for land use, greenhouse gas, and sustainability policy 




Chapter 6: Agent-Based Model of Private Sector Investments 




As was mentioned earlier, a wide range of approaches and models have been 
proposed to study socio-economic effects of private ownership, but few studies have 
been devoted to the detailed analysis of the ownership structure and its resulting 
socio-economic outcome. This chapter extends the previous work on modeling 
public-sector investment decision-making and the research on long-term evolution of 
mixed-ownership roadway networks (Zhang and Levison 2006, Zhang 2008, Zhang et 
al. 2008, Zhang and Yusufzyanova 2011) to analyze the impact of roadway 
privatization on users, investors, and social welfare under regulation.   
The analytical tool developed here is an agent-based model that jointly 
considers capacity expansion and pricing decisions by public and private sectors, 
market entry decisions by the private sector, user demand responses, roadway 
construction and maintenance cost structures, and regulation on private-sector 
investment. In every iteration of the agent-based simulation, each decision-maker 
(private roads, public roads, and system users) adjusts its own behaviors/decisions 
based on available historical system information and its self-interests. For instance, 
users attempt to maximize utility and minimize travel times. Private roads seek to 
maximize profits. Public agencies adopt business-as-usually or welfare-maximizing 




the macro-level dynamics of the mixed-ownership roadway system. Each agent and 
decision-maker is modeled with unique characteristics and preferences (e.g. different 
values of time for users). Private investors base their market entry decisions (i.e. to 
investment or not to invest in roadways) on the estimated returns of investment on 
candidate roadway privatization projects under regulation, their capacity investment 
decisions on long-run profit-maximizing goals, and pricing/tolling decisions on 
current capacity levels and short-run profit-maximizing objectives.  
The initial condition is an existing road network controlled entirely by the 
public sector. As the private sector gradually builds new toll road projects under 
regulation and without, the network shifts to a mixed-ownership regime. Several 
scenarios are being developed here to explore the possibility of equitable network 
ownership within the framework of current transportation system revenue generation 
and resource allocation. The proposed scenarios are described below.  
 
6.2 Introducing Private Entity to the System 
 
The essence of effective road network management with multiple players is 
the ownership structure. To be effective, ownership has to be assigned to a clearly 
defined entity, which can be private or public, or a combination of both. Owners 
generally find it their responsibility to maintain their assets, but owners also have the 
right to sell, lease or abandon them. In the case of roads, responsibility under existing 




highway system, when owners (states and local authorities) depend on others (central 
government) for most of the funding generation and distribution. 
A key element in any ownership is the existence of individuals who lose if 
their asset’s condition gets worse, or gain if the asset increases welfare. In the case of 
publicly provided roads, it is unclear who should become worse off if the roads 
become congested or deteriorate, since the system is set up in such a way that even 
when it is understood, who is responsible for which roads, the current funding 
allocation process contradicts to existing network ownership structure. This creates 
tension not only between state and local entities themselves, but also between road 
users and state/public officials, who fail to deliver well-functioning system through 
tax revenues.   
This implies that effective and efficient road system should have certain 
characteristics. Some of them can be stated as follows:   
• Road network has well established ownership structure; 
• It is financially self-supporting; 
• Revenues generated from roads (whether user charges or tax fees) should go 
to the “owners” of those roads; 
• Roads have common standards for interconnectivity and performance criteria 
(e.g. congestion, safety, accessibility); 
• There is a possibility of private road ownership with certain restrictions or 
constraints. 
The key research question here is to design such a network ownership 




order to maximize overall network performance in terms of social welfare and private 
and public revenues. The ownership scenarios with various regulatory constraints are 
presented below. 
 
6.3 General Framework for Scenario Setting 
 
In all scenarios it is assumed that network development is the result of the 
interactions between public agent and private entities negotiating over network 
ownership. Considering a situation where links are with different capacities, the 
negotiation process is assumed to be organized as follows: public agent considers link 
i to be converted to private ownership at initial price x (A). From the moment an 
interested private agent signs up, the actual negotiation starts. The process of 
negotiation is one in which the public and private agents alternatively make 
counterbids until the parties reach an agreement or until one withdraws from the 
negotiation. If the negotiation turns out successful, the link i goes to private 
ownership. If not, the public agent starts negotiating with another interested private 
party. During each negotiation round, every agent can perform three types of actions: 
it can accept a bid, reject a bid, or propose a counterbid. The bidding process is done 
over the selling price of a particular link, i.e. private agent’s lump-sum payment to the 
public agent, over the price ceiling and over the concession period.  
It is assumed here that all agents select the action from which they expect to 
derive the maximum utility, whether it is maximizing social welfare or maximizing 




expected final price at which the link is given and, thus on the perceived net present 
worth of any particular link. Private agent will be interested in at least recovering its 
investment if the following conditions are in effect:  
• There should be no significant external benefits or costs to building or using 
transportation service (such as noise, air pollution by non users, and external 
benefits might be congestion relief on competing modes or facilities); 
• Investment must be optimal or near optimal for current demand (when 
demand does not change drastically); 
• There should be constant returns of scale in the firm’s long-run costs of 
building and expanding the new facility.  
These conditions will also ensure that private agent will not seek excessive 
profitability from toll facility. Public agent, on the other hand, will try to sell any 
particular link for the price no less than the amount of funding used to construct, 
maintain and operate this link for existing capacity to meet the up-to-date traffic 
demand.   
During negotiation process the actions have to be based on agents’ beliefs. A 
belief means that an agent classifies the phenomenon of interest into a set of discrete 
states or outcomes and assigns some subjective value to each possible outcome of the 
phenomenon, for example, regarding the price of a link falling within some 
predefined price category. With each new bid, the state agent receives new 
information about private agent, on the basis of which it can update its beliefs 
regarding the behavior of this private agent. Agents can at all times decide to stop the 




6.4 Regulatory Policies 
 
A private investor’s tolling and capacity decisions are both subject to 
regulatory policies when privatizing public roadways. Three most-widely adopted 
regulatory schemes on private toll roads in the U.S. are considered.   
Price Ceiling: Price ceiling are probably the most common regulation on 
private toll roads. It states that the toll rate on private roads cannot exceed a certain 
maximum level, defined as a monetary value for a toll facility or as a per-km ceiling 
rate. This simply adds a constraint to the private-sector profit-maximization problem 
(Equation 4.12).   
Revenue Sharing: In some cases, a private toll road may be required by 
contract to share a certain percentage of their revenue or profit with the public 
authority (e.g. state DOT), referred to as revenue sharing regulation.  We can model 
this regulation and its effect on the transportation system by multiplying the 
percentage of revenue sharing with the first term (representing actual private-sector 
revenue) in Equation 4.12.    
Concession Agreement: Concession agreement requires the private sector to 
transfer the ownership of a toll road to the public authority after a pre-determined 
concession period. This type of regulatory schemes has been recently observed on the 
Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road PPP agreement. To model concession 






6.5 Development of Roadway Privatization Scenarios 
 
Four policy scenarios are developed in this chapter, including two roadway 
privatization scenarios and two benchmark scenarios for comparison purposes.  
 
6.5.1 Benchmark Scenario 1: Base Case 
The base case scenario represents the status quo in public-sector road 
financing in the U.S. without private-sector investment (i.e. no roadway 
privatization). Only the public sector makes pricing, maintenance, and capacity 
investment decisions. The pricing model in this scenario considers average-cost user 
pricing, which is consistent with current federal and state fuel taxes and other public-
sector transportation revenue streams (e.g. registration fees) in the U.S. The user 
charge is almost entirely independent of when and where the driving takes place. The 
business-as-usually investment rules are adopted for the base case to represent the 
existing multi-agency public-sector roadway investment decision-making process. In 
the base case scenario, multiple public-sector agencies are modeled, which represents 
state and local transportation agencies that have different objectives (i.e. regional 
transportation goals versus local transportation goals). This multi-agency nature of 
current public-sector transportation decision-making is likely to make the final 
investment decisions less effective than those made by a single public-sector agency 





6.5.2 Benchmark Scenario 2: Socially Optimal 
The socially optimal scenario assumes welfare-maximizing pricing and 
investment decisions, and therefore produces the theoretically maximum social 
welfare. In this scenario, it is assumed that all roadways are controlled by a single 
welfare-maximizing agency. Marginal cost pricing based on congestion externalities 
is implemented throughout the entire roadway network. Revenue generated from 
marginal-cost tolls is then invested for long-run maximum net social benefits.  
 
6.5.3 Privatization Scenario 1: Private Takeover of Existing Public Roads 
In the first privatization scenarios, the public sector may decide to lease 
existing public roads to the private sector for a predetermined period of time, i.e. 
concession period, and allow the private sectors to charge user tolls during the 
concession period. The private road tolls cannot exceed a certain pre-set price ceiling. 
In exchange, the private sector pays the public sector a certain amount of money in a 
lump-sum at the beginning of the concession period. The amount of lump-sum 
payment is negotiated between the public and the private-sector decision-makers, and 
should be correlated to the long-run return on the private-sector investment and the 
market value of the public road being contracted out. The lump-sum payment could 
be considered as a form of revenue sharing before the toll revenue is actually realized. 
While the private investor may further expand the capacity of the road during the 
concession period, the incentive to do so may be very limited because of the fixed 
concession period and lack of competition in this case. Private toll roads may expand 




capacity expansion profitable. With the lump-sum payment from the private sector, 
the public sector is assumed to reinvest the lump-sum payment into the maintenance 
and/or capacity expansion of public roads. It should be noted that if the lump-sum 
payment is used for non-transportation purposes (e.g. paying off debt, or investing in 
other sectors), the transportation system benefits of this privatization scenario are 
expected to decrease significantly. Once the concession period is over, the private 
sector returns the private toll roads to public ownership. This scenario is modeled 
after the recent Chicago Skyway and Indiana Toll Road PPP projects in the U.S. 
 
6.5.4 Privatization Scenario 2: New Private Toll Roads 
In the second roadway privatization scenario, the private sector is allowed to 
invest into the construction of new toll roads, charge users subject to price ceiling, 
and operates the toll roads for a certain concession period, and finally return the new 
toll roads to public ownership after the concession period is over. The private sector 
must invest in new roadway capacity to enter the market. There is no lump-sum 
payment that the private sector needs to make to the public sector at the beginning of 
the concession period in this case. Private toll roads are also required to share a 
certain percentage of their profit with the public-sector. Public roads will likely not 
expand as much capacity as in the previous privatization scenario due to the absence 
of initial lump-sum payments from the private sector. This scenario is modeled after 





In both privatization scenarios, the public sector is assumed to adopt business-as-





Chapter 7: Simulation Results of the Agent-Based Model 
of Private Investments  
 
7.1 Test Network and Model Execution 
 
In this chapter the agent-based model of private sector investments is being 
tested on a hypothetical city network. Here the model is applied to the grid roadway 
network for ease of interpretation. System-level patterns can also be more easily 
identified in the grid network than real-world networks. The hypothetical city 
network consists of a 10-by-10 roadway grid with each directional roadway link 
measuring 2 miles in length and having an initial capacity of 775 vehicles/hour. This 
capacity value corresponds to a typical one-lane directional road in U.S. cities. A 
uniform land use pattern is assumed, and each of the 100 nodes has 100 residents (for 
trip production) and 100 jobs (for trip attraction).  
When the agent-based simulation for each of the four policy scenarios is 
executed, the travel demand model first predicts link-level flows based on land use 
and current roadway network attributes. Based on demand forecasts and current 
pricing strategies, revenues available to various public- and private-sector agents in 
the system are then computed respectively. These revenues are employed to maintain 
existing roads, expand roadway capacity, and/or produce revenue surpluses or profits 
based on public- and private-sector investment rules. After each round of investment 
decisions, the network is updated with improved capacities. Network performance 




miles of private and public roads, mobility, accessibility, public and private road tolls, 
revenues collected by each road, user benefits/consumer surplus, profits, and net 
social benefits. A time horizon of 50 years has been selected for all simulation 
experiments to observe the short- and long-run effects of the base case, socially 
optimal, and two privatization scenarios. After 50 years, the roadway network appears 
to have achieved equilibrium under each of the four policy scenarios. For the two 
privatization scenarios, the following regulatory policies are enforced: (1) 30-year 
concession period; (2) 50% profit-sharing with the public sector; and (3) 4 cents/km 
price ceiling. This set of regulatory policies provides high user and social benefits 
compared to other regulatory policies tested.  
 
7.2 Simulation Results 
 
The evolution of the grid network under the four policies scenarios is 
illustrated in Figure 7-1 with lane-kilometers of roadways being the measure of 
network development over time. By examining the socially optimal scenario (the line 
on the top), one can observe that the initial network in Year 0 is significantly 
underinvested and the network is severely congested. With revenue from high initial 
marginal cost tolls, roadway capacity is soon expanded to the optimal level, i.e. 
almost twice of the initial network capacity. In contrast, under the base case scenario 
(the thickest solid line in the middle of the graph), the average cost pricing practices 
cannot produce sufficient revenue for optimal capacity investment. While the public 








Figure 7-1: Lane Kilometers of Public and Private Roads (km) 
 
This contrast between the base case and socially optimal scenarios is 
representative of the network conditions in places where private-sector investment in 
roadway networks has been considered or implemented. The other four lines in the 
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and public roads in each of these two scenarios are plotted separately. In the scenario 
wherein the private sector only takes over existing public roads through 
leasing/concession agreement (referred to as the “private takeover” scenario 
hereafter), the private sector quickly takes over a large number of roadways in the 
network, shown by the quick increase of private road lane miles and quick decrease 
of public road lane miles in Figure 7-1. The spatial monopoly power of roadways 
promises profitability on these roadways, and the private sector quickly takes 
advantage of it. Interestingly, there is no future capacity expansion on the private 
roads throughout the 30-year concession period (the flat part of the curve between 
Year 5 and Year 35). Again, the spatial monopoly power of private roads in this 
private takeover scenario makes any capacity expansion on private roads undesirable 
from the profit-maximization perspective. However, the public sector, with large 
amounts of lump-sum payments from the private sector, is able to construct much 
more capacity than that in the base case scenario. In the scenario where the private 
sector can only invest in new private toll road capacity (referred to as the “New 
Private Road” scenario hereafter), the public sector can still build more capacity than 
that in the base case scenario, but not as much capacity as that in the private takeover 
case. This is because the revenue from the profit-sharing term with new private toll 
roads is less than that from the lump-sum payment in private takeover agreements.        
The equilibrium networks after the 50-year simulation period under the two 





a) New Private Roads Scenario 
 
 
b) Private Takeover Scenario 
 





The majority of capacity expansion takes place near the center of the network 
in both scenarios, which makes sense since travel demand is the highest in the center 
of the network. It should be noted that for the private sector, there are also incentives 
to build new private toll roads or take over existing public roads near the four corners 
of the network, because competition from parallel roads is at the minimum in the 
corners. It appears the high demand effect favoring capacity expansion in the center 
overshadow the spatial monopoly effect in the corners in this mixed-ownership grid 
network.   
Average link tolls (see Figure 7-3) are different in the four policy scenarios. 
The base case scenario exhibits the lowest user tolls, equivalent to about 1.6 cents per 
km in all years (i.e. no increase in fuel taxes or other road user fees). The marginal 
cost tolls in the socially optimal scenario are the highest, and are as high as 11.6 cents 
per kilometer when congestion is at its worst level at the beginning of the simulation 
period. Roadway privatization allows the private roads to charge higher tolls than the 
public roads. The overall levels of link tolls in the two privatization scenarios are 
closer to the socially optimal tolls than those in the base case, which is desirable from 
welfare-maximization point of view.  The effect of price ceiling regulation can be 
observed in both privatization scenarios, especially the private take over scenario. 
The ceiling price may be increased to further improve the pricing efficiency of toll 
roads, but at the same time higher ceiling price may reduce user benefits in the long 
run (i.e. higher overall social welfare, but also with higher percentages of welfare 
gains allocated to the private sector). The private sector is also able to charge higher 




This is because all new private toll roads in our test are built parallel to existing 
public roads (e.g. similar to new express toll lanes next to existing publicly-owned 
general purpose lanes). The presence of competition from parallel public roads 
prevents new private toll roads to charge even higher tolls.  
 
Figure 7-3: Average Link Toll ($/km) 
 
Now all private roads can make profits. This is true in the real world as shown 
by recent bankruptcy of several private toll roads in the U.S., and in this model 
because any private road at the time of investment decision-making in the model only 
has historical demand information and cannot perfectly predict future investment and 
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4 shows the profitability of private roads over time. In the private takeover case, 
almost all private roads make profits in all years due to their spatial monopoly powers 
(no direct competition from the public sector). This is not the case in the private new 
road scenario wherein the percentage of private toll roads making profits can be as 
low as 65%. These results highlight the value of non-compete clauses in PPP 




Figure 7-4: Percentage of Private Roads Making Profit (%) 
 
A comparison of the net social benefits (i.e. social welfare = user benefit + 
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Figure 7-5). Without private-sector investment, the overall net social benefit in the 
base case scenario is about 32% of that in the socially optimal scenario. This 
percentage can be improved to 51% and 79% respectively with new private roads and 
private takeover policies under proper regulation. While the net social benefits are 
higher in the private takeover scenario than in the new private road scenario on our 
test network, this result may or may not be generalized to other networks for at least 
two reasons. First, this result is based on the assumption that lump-sum payments 
from the private sector are used by the public sector for much needed roadway 
capacity improvement and maintenance activities. This is not always true in the real 
world. Private-sector payments based on real-world concession agreements have been 
used for non-transportation purposes in the past. Second, the grid network used in our 
analysis tends to create significant competition among multiple parallel roads (public 
or private roads), which to some extent dampen the welfare-reducing effects of 
roadway monopoly powers. In a different network (e.g. hub-and-spoke type of 
network where certainly neighborhood may have to rely on few or even a single 
major road for access the rest of the network), the type and intensity of roadway 






Figure 7-5: Net Social Benefits ($1,000) 
 
7.3 Model Summary 
 
From a broad systems perspective, an increased involvement of private sector 
investment resources in transportation financing implies the transfer of private sector 
capitals from other investment opportunities in the economy to the transportation 
sector, and the relief of scarce government transportation funds for other needed 






















been argued that when there exists an appropriate level of competition, the private 
sector is intrinsically more efficient than the public sector in the provision and 
operation of traditionally publicly-provided services. In the case of transportation, 
private roads with profit incentives are more likely to impose congestion-sensitive 
tolls, which tend to be more efficient than the existing average pricing schemes 
through fuel taxes.  The recent emergence of more than a dozen public-private-
partnerships toll-road projects across the U.S. suggests a positive momentum, and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation’s Congestion Initiative Program has called for 
“unleashing private sector investment resources”. An increasing number of states 
have removed or in the process of removing legal constraints on private toll roads.  
This chapter models the price and capacity decisions of private toll roads 
when they compete with existing public roads on a general network. Both the 
analytical findings and application results on a test network are in favor of 
introducing private toll roads to current public road systems characterized by growing 
congestion, insufficient public funding, and inefficient pricing practices. The key to 
successful roadway privatization includes proper regulation, practical policy 
packages, improved transportation services to users, privatization schemes that work 
with local conditions, and a healthy functioning private-sector capital market.  
A distinctive feature of the agent-based modeling tool developed and 
demonstrated in this chapter is that public/private-sector decision-makers and system 
users all make and adjust their behaviors according to others’ decisions in a time and 
space continuum. The roadway network evolves in a complex and decentralized 




ownership (public and private) scheme when policies favoring roadway privatization 
are implemented. The proposed model and policy analysis approach can be applied to 





Chapter 8: Impact of Regulation and Network Topology on 




As was mentioned in earlier chapters, private investment resources have 
already found several ways to enter the U.S. roadway systems. Various PPP schemes 
have been adopted to finance, lease, design, build, operate, maintain, and own transfer 
stages. However, various considerations need to be addressed regarding the proper 
scope of private sector involvement in roadway financing. Roads have monopoly 
power because they uniquely occupy space. Private roads may exercise their 
monopoly power and make socially undesirable over-pricing and under-investment 
decisions.   
The long-standing interest in measuring the spatial structure of road networks 
has been driven by the inherent impact of network structure on the performance of 
transportation systems (Mohring 1961; Marshall 2005, Xie and Levinson 2007). 
Specifically, typical connection patterns such as beltway and grid in transportation 
systems have been studied for years. Overall, there exist four general patterns of 
intercity highways: tree, grid, grid-diagonal and regular triangle. For street networks 
inside a city, various studies often classify the networks into grid, radial and circular 
shapes or their combinations. These hypothetical network types are often used in 
comparisons of their capacities, reliabilities and urban structures and other overall 




the influence of network topology on privatization patterns, which is what explored in 
this chapter.  
To reliably estimate the impact of roadway monopoly effects on roadway 
privatization, this chapter tests the agent-based model, developed in earlier chapters, 
on networks with different topologies to illustrate the influence of network topology 
on privatization patterns. In order to make the analysis in this chapter more relevant 
to current policy debates and practices in the U.S., one popular privatization scheme, 
namely construction and operation of new private toll roads, is modeled under 
concession period, price ceiling and revenue sharing regulations. The model is then 
tested on hypothetical city networks with grid and beltway topologies. Based on the 
simulation results, a number of insights are provided about impacts of ownership and 
network structures on the socio-economic performance in transportation systems and 
transportation network changes over time.  
 
8.2 Development of Roadway Privatization Scenarios 
 
In the analysis herein, the agent-based model of public and private 
investments jointly considers capacity expansion and pricing decisions by public and 
private sectors, market entry decisions by the private sector, user demand responses, 
roadway construction and maintenance cost structures, and regulation of private-
sector investment. In each iteration of the agent-based simulation, each decision-
maker (private roads, public roads, and system users) adjusts their 




interests: users attempt to maximize utility and minimize travel times; private road 
providers seek to maximize profits and public agencies adopt business-as-usual (as in 
real world) or welfare-maximizing pricing and investment decisions. Each agent and 
decision-maker is modeled with unique characteristics and preferences (e.g., different 
values of time for users). Private investors base their market entry decisions (i.e., to 
investment or not to invest in roadways) on the estimated returns of investment on 
candidate roadway privatization projects under regulation, their capacity investment 
decisions on long-run profit-maximizing goals, and pricing/tolling decisions on 
current capacity levels and short-run profit-maximizing objectives (Please refer to 
previous chapters for detailed description of the model components).  
The initial condition of the analysis is an existing road network controlled 
entirely by the public sector. As the private sector builds new toll road projects, the 
network gradually shifts to a mixed-ownership regime. Three policy scenarios are 
developed for each network topology, grid and beltway, including one roadway 
privatization scenarios and two benchmark scenarios for comparison purposes. 
  
8.2.1 Benchmark Scenario 1: Base Case 
The base case scenario represents the status quo in public sector road 
financing in the U.S. without private-sector investment (i.e., no roadway 
privatization). Only the public sector makes pricing, maintenance, and capacity 
investment decisions. The pricing model in this scenario considers average cost user 
pricing, which is consistent with current federal and state fuel taxes and other public 




charge is almost entirely independent of when and where the driving takes place. The 
business-as-usual investment rules are adopted for the base case to represent the 
existing multi-agency public sector roadway investment decision-making process. In 
the base case scenario, multiple public-sector agencies are modeled, which represents 
state and local transportation agencies that have different objectives (i.e., regional 
transportation goals versus local transportation goals). This multi-agency nature of 
current public-sector transportation decision-making is likely to make the final 
investment decisions less effective in terms of system welfare than those made by a 
single public-sector agency controlling all roadways. 
 
8.2.2 Benchmark Scenario 2: Socially Optimal 
The socially optimal scenario assumes welfare-maximizing pricing and 
investment decisions, and therefore produces the theoretically maximum social 
welfare. In this scenario, it is assumed that all roadways are controlled by a single 
welfare-maximizing agency. Marginal cost pricing based on congestion externalities 
is implemented throughout the entire roadway network. Revenue generated from 
marginal cost tolls is then invested for long-run maximum net social benefits.  
 
8.2.3 Privatization Scenario: New Private Toll Roads 
In this roadway privatization scenario, the private sector is allowed to invest 
into the construction of new toll roads, charge users subject to price ceiling, and 




roads to public ownership after the concession period is over. The private sector must 
invest in new roadway capacity to enter the market. Private toll roads are required to 
share a certain percentage of their profit with the public sector. Public roads will 
likely not expand much capacity due to the absence of initial lump-sum payments 
from the private sector. While the private investor may further expand the capacity of 
the road during the concession period, the incentive to do so may be very limited 
because of the fixed concession period and lack of competition in this case. Private 
toll roads may expand their capacity only if there is significant travel demand 
increase, which makes capacity expansion profitable. Once the concession period is 
over, the private sector returns the private toll roads to public ownership. This 
scenario is modeled after new privately-invested express toll lanes and high 
occupancy toll lanes in the U.S. Here it is also assumed that the public sector adopts 
business-as-usual pricing and investment decisions already discussed in previous 
sections.  
 
8.2.4 Network Topology Description 
Grid Network  
Grid network is considered one of the most popular city road network 
topologies, especially in US. That is why we have chosen this network structure for 
our analysis. Grid network in this research consists of links with 3.2 km in length and 
has an initial capacity of 775 vehicles/hour on each link. This capacity value 




pattern is assumed, and each of the 100 nodes has 100 residents (for trip production) 
and 100 jobs (for trip attraction). (See Figure 8.2 for network representation). 
Beltway Network  
Beltway style topology is pretty widespread in Europe and Asia. This type of 
network has an advantage of connecting the periphery roads to city center through 
beltway roadways. In our analysis each link between zones is also 3.2 km in length as 
in grid network structure and has an initial capacity of 775 vehicles/hour on each link. 
A uniform land use pattern is assumed, and each of the nodes has 100 residents (for 




When the agent-based simulation for each of the policy scenarios is executed, 
the travel demand model first predicts link-level flows based on land use and current 
roadway network attributes. Based on demand forecasts and current pricing strategies, 
revenues available to various public sector and private sector agents in the system are 
then computed.  These revenues are employed to maintain existing roads, expand 
roadway capacity, and/or produce revenue surpluses or profits based on public sector 
and private sector investment rules. After each round of investment decisions, the 
network is updated with improved capacities. Network performance measures are 
computed for each investment cycle (one cycle per year), including lane miles of 
private and public roads, mobility, accessibility, public and private road tolls, 




social benefits. A time horizon of 50 years has been selected for all simulation 
experiments to observe the short- and long-run effects of the base case, the socially 
optimal case, and the two privatization scenarios. After 50 years, the roadway 
networks appear to have achieved equilibrium under each of the three policy 
scenarios. For the privatization scenario, the following regulatory policies are 
enforced: (1) 30-year concession period; (2) 50% profit-sharing with the public 
sector; and (3) 4 cents/km price ceiling. This set of regulatory policies provides high 
user and social benefits compared to other regulatory policies tested.  
The evolution of the grid and beltway networks under the three policies 
scenarios is illustrated in Figure 8-1 with lane-kilometers of roadways being the 
measure of network development over time. By examining the socially optimal 
scenario (the line on the top), one can observe that the initial network in Year 0 is 
significantly underinvested and the network is severely congested on both networks. 
With revenue from high initial marginal cost tolls, roadway capacity is soon 
expanded to the optimal level. In contrast, under the base case scenario (the thickest 
solid line in the middle of both graphs), the average cost pricing practices cannot 
produce sufficient revenue for optimal capacity investment. While the public sector is 
still able to gradually expand roadway capacity over time, additional revenue sources 
would help increase the network capacity closer to the optimal capacity levels. This 
contrast between the base case and socially optimal scenarios is representative of the 
network conditions in places where private sector investment in roadway networks 










a) Beltway Network 
 
Figure 8-1: Lane Kilometers of Public and Private Roads (km) 
 
The third line in the graphs corresponds to the privatization scenarios of 
developing new roads. The lane kilometers of private and public roads are plotted 
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scenario. This is because public agencies receive shared revenues from private toll 
roads.  
The equilibrium networks after the 50-year simulation period on two networks 
are illustrated in Figure 8-2. In the grid network the majority of capacity expansion 
takes place near the center of the network, which makes sense since travel demand is 
the highest in the center of the network. For the case of beltway network, we can see 
the most network expansion in the center of the network as well as along the hub-and-
spoke connection. The expansion along the hub-and-spoke connection is essential to 
accommodate growing demand in the periphery parts of the network, therefore it is 
cost effective for the private sector to build new roads in those parts of the network. 
Average link tolls (see Figure 8-3) are different in the three policy scenarios. The 
base case scenario exhibits the lowest user tolls. The marginal cost tolls in the 
socially optimal scenario are the highest, and are as high as 11.6 cents per kilometer 
when congestion is at its worst level at the beginning of the simulation period on grid 
network, and as high as 23 cents on the beltway network. Roadway privatization 
allows the private roads to charge higher tolls than the public roads. The overall 
levels of link tolls in the privatization scenario are closer to the socially optimal tolls 
than those in the base case, which is desirable from welfare-maximization point of 
view. The effect of price ceiling regulation can be also observed on both networks. 
The ceiling price may be increased to further improve the pricing efficiency of toll 
roads, but at the same time a higher ceiling price may reduce user benefits in the long 




gains allocated to the private sector). The private sector is also able to charge higher 
tolls on beltway roadway network.  
 
                                                     
                                                            
c)  Private Ownership of New Roads Scenario on Grid Network 
 
                   
                                    
                                                                                                        
a) Private Ownership of New Roads Scenario on Beltway Network 
 






This is because all new private toll roads in our test are built parallel to 
existing public roads (e.g., similar to new express toll lanes next to existing publicly-
owned general purpose lanes), and in beltway network this competition is less likely, 








b) Beltway Network 
 


































Not all private roads can make profits. This is true in the real world as shown 
by the recent bankruptcy of several private toll roads in the U.S., and in our model 
because any private road at the time of investment decision-making in the model only 
has historical demand information and cannot perfectly predict future investment and 
pricing decisions by the public sector or its own private-sector competitors. Figure 8-
4 shows the profitability of private roads over time.  
 
 
Figure 8-4: Percentage of Private Roads making Profit (%) 
 
On beltway network, almost all private roads make profits in all years due to 
their spatial monopoly powers. On the grid network we can also observe many private 
roads making profits, however their percentage is generally lower than in beltway 
network case, since competition between public and private roads is higher in grid 
network due to public agencies spatial monopoly advantage.   
A comparison of the net social benefits (i.e., social welfare = user benefit + 
private sector profit) produces the following results (see Figure 8-5). Without private-
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on grid network and 25% on beltway network of that in the socially optimal scenario. 
This percentage can be improved to 51% and 30%, respectively, with new private 
roads under proper policy regulation.  
 
 
a) Beltway Network 
 
Figure 8-5: Net Social Benefits ($1,000) 
 
Not very significant increases in net social benefits in both cases can be 
explained by the fact that networks used in our analysis tend to create significant 
competition among multiple parallel roads (public or private roads), which to some 
extent dampen the welfare-reducing effects of roadway monopoly powers. Additional 
privatization scenarios, such as taking over public roads with and without regulation, 






















This chapter for the first time analyzed how different network topologies 
affect decisions of public and private agencies about location and expansion of the 
links. Both the analytical findings and application results on test networks are in favor 
of introducing private toll roads to current public road systems characterized by 
growing congestion, insufficient public funding, and inefficient pricing practices.  
Findings from a grid and beltway networks show that beltway network 
initially is more efficient than the grid network, however in the long run grid network 
shows better system performance results. For the case of beltway network, we can see 
the most network expansion in the center of the network as well as along the hub-and-
spoke connection. The availability of hub-and-spoke connection in beltway network 
is in favor of private companies since it is cost effective for the private sector to build 
new roads in those parts of the network. However, the goal of profit-maximization, 
the existence of spatial monopoly, complex interdependencies, and severe 
competition could all cause private roads to adopt socially non-optimal tolls and 
capacities. Private roads in a market economy are particularly robust in areas with 
increasing travel demand. Yet, price-ceiling regulation is shown to help overcome 
many of the drawbacks of a decentralized public-private ownership. In addition, on 
beltway network, almost all private roads make profits in all years due to their spatial 
monopoly powers. On the grid network we can also observe many private roads 
making profits, however their percentage is generally lower than in beltway network 




due to public agencies spatial monopoly advantage. Significant competition among 
parallel roads (public and private) reduces the welfare effects in the system; however 
we still see some increases in net social benefits for users. Additional privatization 
scenarios, such as taking over public roads with and without regulation, would 












There is an increased awareness in the U.S. and around the world that 
traditional sources of funding major transportation projects are no longer sufficient to 
address their pressing expansion, upgrade, maintenance, and operational needs. 
Consequently, governmental agencies are exploring alternative options available. The 
interaction of the unwillingness of politicians to raise taxes, the eagerness of private 
and other sectors to partner with governmental agencies in the delivery of services, 
the availability of private capital funds to invest in infrastructure projects, and the 
willingness of public and private partners to share the liabilities and risks is proving 
to be the motivating force towards the increased use of such arrangements. While 
privatization shows its success based on improved efficiency, some scientists are 
cautious of excessive reliance on such arrangements due to a lack of widespread 
evidence of their effectiveness.  In order to relieve the public transportation financial 
problem, the public-private partnerships will still be a trend in the near future in the 
United Sates. After review of the current practical road privatization projects in the 
United States and the status of academic research in this area, it was clear that the gap 
between the practices and the theoretical studies is quite obvious. This dissertation tried 
to close this gap by identifying the driving forces behind the transportation 
investment decisions currently prevalent in public agencies and developing empirical 




decisions of public and private roads with different regulatory policy packages to help 
decision-makers to make a wise choice when facing a PPP toll road projects. It answered 
the following questions: What investment processes government agencies currently 
employ to fund transportation facilities? How investment decisions affect 
transportation network configurations in the long-run? What factors determine the 
utilization of private finance for highway projects? How do public and private parties 
shape a partnership to develop a toll road with private finance?   
This chapter presents a review of the contents of the dissertation as well as a 
summary of its findings and conclusions. It also highlights recommendations and 
suggestion for future studies regarding developed methodologies. 
 
9.2 Summary of Findings and Distinctive Features of the Research 
 
This research developed a practical and efficient methodology for quantifying 
infrastructure investment decisions at state and local levels of government and 
developed agent-based models of public and private investment processes in highway 
capacity expansion and maintenance projects. The methodology included an 
empirical analysis of the investment decision processes of public transportation 
agencies. The agent-based decision-making model was developed to consider 
transportation investment processes at different levels of government which forecasts 
future transportation networks and their performance under both existing and 
alternative transportation planning processes. Also, various highway privatization 




analyzing regulatory policies on private-sector transportation investments was 
developed. The developed models were demonstrated on networks with grid and 
beltway topologies to reveal the influence of network topology on privatization 
decisions.  The developed models and methodology can be used to consider all 
stakeholders’ preferences and to support decisions related to capacity expansion and 
infrastructure privatization. 
A thorough analysis of the multimodal transportation investment decision 
rules and processes adopted by various jurisdictions in the Washington DC-Baltimore 
area was performed to provide initial inputs into the agent-based model of public 
investment processes. Interviews have been conducted with staff members at the 
county-, metropolitan-, state- and regional-level agencies. Findings from these 
interviews revealed the details of the investment process in this region, and the 
advantages and disadvantages of the existing processes and procedures.  The main 
conclusion that emerged from this empirical analysis and indicated areas in which 
improvements could take place is that a more decentralized investment-decision 
making process between different levels of government is a key to creating a 
comprehensive regional land use and transportation short- and long-range planning as 
well as an environment for better resource allocations. Establishing innovative rules 
of engagement for planning and investment, defining new roles in the county and 
MPO decision-making process, recognizing that every agency in the Region is 
important, managing or reducing political procedures while maintaining the integrity 
of the State investment process – are the ways when decision-making process can 




The findings from empirical analysis of investment processes have been used 
to develop the integrated agent-based models of public and private investment 
processes that bring together all the relevant components, such as travel demand 
module, transport supply module, public and private road suppliers, investment rules, 
regulation policies, and the interactions of agents to simulate road expansion and 
resulting network changes. The unique feature of the developed agent-based models 
is that they consider transportation demand and supply jointly in a coherent 
theoretical and modeling framework. Understanding the true relationships between 
demand and supply in single or mixed ownership environment in transportation 
systems is the crucial task in theoretical development of transportation models. This 
research models network growth as a bottom-up process by which the expansion of 
roads is driven by interdependent decisions of transportation authorities and private 
firms. The agent-based simulation method is an appealing modeling approach for 
analyzing the simultaneous and interactive changes of demand and supply changes 
over time. This modeling approach is very suitable when evaluating transportation 
management decisions and policies. The result is an agent-based model of public and 
private investments which is capable of handling and solving large-scale, practical, 
complicated infrastructure privatization decision-making problems. Both the 
analytical findings and application results on test networks are in favor of introducing 
private toll roads to current public road systems characterized by growing congestion, 
insufficient public funding, and inefficient pricing practices. However, what is 
important to keep in mind is that the key to successful roadway privatization includes 




users, privatization schemes that work with local conditions, and a healthy 
functioning private-sector capital market.    
A distinctive feature of the agent-based modeling tools developed and 
demonstrated in this research is that public/private-sector decision-makers and system 
users all make and adjust their behaviors according to others’ decisions in a time and 
space continuum. The roadway network evolves in a complex and decentralized 
manner, and can gradually transition from a pure-ownership (public) to a mixed-
ownership (public and private) scheme when policies favoring roadway privatization 
are implemented. Also, the developed methodologies allow accommodating the 
decision process from various decision-making groups, thus helping the decision 
makers to accommodate diverse judgments; the users of the models are able to run a 
what-if analysis at different stages of the decision process. The developed models are 
simple to apply and can therefore save time and avoid the costs associated with wrong 
decisions.  
 
9.3 Research Contributions 
 
This dissertation is one of the first devoted to a thorough empirical 
investigation of the current investment decision-making processes of transportation 
agencies at different levels of government, and application of this empirical findings 
to predicting transportation network evolution patterns in the long-run through 
developing the agent-based network growth model under public ownership regime. In 




welfare impacts of road privatization projects in mixed ownership networks and 
allows evaluating various policy packages targeted at the private toll roads, as well as 
helps to reveal the financial implications for private investors and public road 
authorities. This modeling tool is designed through agent-based technique, which 
makes it unique for this matter as the idea of decentralized, local and state control, as 
well as private ownership distinguishes this analysis from one where a central 
authority maximizes global welfare. What is also noteworthy, the simulation results 
of public and mixed ownership agent-based models developed in the dissertation are 
consistent with what is empirically known about investment decisions and network 
financing in the real world. 
Overall, the findings of this dissertation provide imperative insights to both 
the industry and academia. First, this research’ findings have significant practical 
implications for mitigating the current transportation financial shortage in the U.S. 
The searching for nonconventional sources of funding has become inevitable with the 
falling of the buying power of motor fuel taxes and the growing demand for 
transportation investment. Utilizing private finance is a promising alternative to 
provide extra road capacity without further straining government’s budget. For 
governments considering partnering with private sector, the findings on the formation 
and regulations of toll road partnership offer specific information about how to shape 
partnerships in toll road development to meet welfare maximizing objectives. Second, 
this research sheds light on factors that determine the use of private finance for 
particular projects. This is done through the following approach: 
• Indentifying the relationship between the investment decision and the network 




• Developing the methodological framework that can be used to assess the financial 
viability of different types of public-private projects in transportation infrastructure; 
• Developing the methodological framework that can be used to evaluate private toll-
road projects, taking into account their socio-economic outcomes.  
Third, the proposed agent-based approach for privatization and network 
ownership analysis poses a major challenge with regard to modeling methodology. 
The evolutionary nature of the investment decision-making process makes agent-
based simulation appropriate for linking individual participating parties’ behavior. 
Agent-based techniques originate from traditional computer-based simulation and 
cellular automata. In general an agent-based model consists of three elements: agents, 
an environment, and behavioral rules. It is useful for modeling how behaviors of and 
interactions among individual decision makers create complex system patterns.  
The results of this research can be used by the various project stakeholders 
(the public authority, the private investors, policy makers) to gain insights on the 
financial viability of roadway projects and ultimately decide on its selection and 
future implementation. The detailed models regarding the case of private roads can be 
used by road authorities, private investors, and policy makers to quantitatively assess 
the probability of success of such projects during their planning phase and decide 
whether or not they should move towards privatization. Public-sector agencies can 
apply developed agent-based models to evaluate the welfare and user impacts of a 
particular regulatory policy, a set of regulatory terms in a public-private contract, or a 
particular private toll road project. Private-sector investors can use the models to 
analyze the profitability of a private toll road project under various regulatory 




9.4 Limitation of the Research 
 
This research has made significant contributions, but there are several 
limitations as well. The major limitations are:  
• The test data are relatively limited, and even though the Grid and Beltway 
Network topologies provided an insight for the developed models’ 
performance, more cases would enable a comprehensive analysis. This 
limitation resulted from two main factors: (1) the application of agent-based 
modeling to transportation privatization is relatively new, so there are limited 
potential implemented cases; and (2) within this field, data from the public 
sector is incomplete.  
• While developed agent-based models are capable of studying the welfare 
impacts of road privatization projects in public and mixed ownership networks 
and allow evaluating various policy packages targeted at the private toll roads, 
model validation part is missing in this research due to the relatively new 
concept of developing agent-based models for transport supply problems.  
• This research focused on the supply side of the network growth process with 
various stakeholders involved, however it did not use comprehensive demand 
model to estimate initial network characteristics. While it does not play a 
major role in this research, additional improvements of the demand side model 
could take place, such as removing user homogeneity constraint and uniform 




• This research modeled private sector investments and explained all used 
market entry criteria, however it did not account for limited private sector 
investment opportunities and/or the possibility of private investment into other 
sectors of the economy.  
 
9.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
This dissertation undertook a significant amount of work in establishing a 
methodological framework for the evaluation of the current and alternative 
investment decision-making processes and financial viability of highway privatization 
projects in transportation infrastructure. Several concepts were used, models were 
developed and assumptions were made during that process. As with every similar 
effort, the overall results of this dissertation are subject to the validity of these 
assumptions and the remaining unavoidable limitations that such efforts present due 
to the very nature of the modeling process, which is in the end an approximation of 
the real world. As a result, this dissertation research was not intended to solve all 
problems related to the assessment of highway investment decisions and privatization 
projects in transportation infrastructure. Despite significant contributions of this 
research and the capabilities and benefits of the developed agent-based models of 
public and private investments, a number of improvements would be beneficial. In 
general, results from this numerical example are in favor of private toll roads.  
However, it is unclear to what extent these findings hold on large real-world 




complementary relationships with existing public roads. The following section 
develops an evolutionary model to explore this issue. One of the improvements would 
be to model the adjustment of the behavior of public agencies (i.e. changes in their 
investment processes) after privatization takes place in certain areas of the network. 
Another recommendation would be to test the models on the real-world transportation 
network and other networks with alternative topologies to better study the effects of 
topology on privatization arrangements. Also, by building a privatization library that 
contains information about previous privatization experiences, history, criteria, 
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